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Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French
L. CAMILLE HÉBERT*
INTRODUCTION
One of the challenges in establishing the existence of actionable sexual
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 has been to prove that
the harassing conduct, even when it is explicitly sexual, has occurred “because
of . . . sex”—a requirement for actionable sexual harassment. Because sexual
harassment in the context of the American workplace is prohibited as a form of
discrimination on the basis of sex, harassment that is not seen as fitting within
the framework of sex discrimination is not generally considered to be unlawful.2
Accordingly, the courts have insisted that the harassment to which targets are
subjected be shown to have been motivated by the sex or gender of that target,3
and not by other considerations, such as actual or perceived sexual orientation4
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
2. It is true that the harassing conduct that is not considered to be based on sex might violate
other legal prohibitions, such as the tort restrictions on assault and battery or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but harassing conduct that is not considered to be based on sex does not violate
Title VII’s prohibition on sexual harassment.
3. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the United States Supreme
Court stressed:
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed
only at “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.” We have never held that workplace
harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations. “The
critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed.”
Id. at 80 (emphasis in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
4. In the United States, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is generally not
prohibited as a matter of federal law, because it is not expressly prohibited, nor is it considered to be
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, and is prohibited in only a minority, though a growing
number, of states. See L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW 9-4 – 9-434 (Thomson Reuters
2012) (reviewing the history and attempted justifications of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, as well as case law and statutory authority related to such discrimination, including
challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which have been rejected by most courts;
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or simple personal dislike. Accordingly, in a number of cases of both oppositesex and same-sex harassment, courts have concluded that explicitly sexually
denigrating conduct was not motivated by sex, and therefore was not prohibited
by Title VII.5
I have explained elsewhere my concerns about the questionable analysis
that has caused courts to conclude that explicitly sexually denigrating conduct is
not based on sex,6 and I will not repeat those arguments here. However, my
concerns about those holdings have caused me to explore the possibility of a law
of sexual harassment divorced from the “because of . . . sex” requirement—a
prohibition against sexual harassment in the workplace that does not require a
showing that the harassment was motivated by sexual desire, gender hostility, or
sexual stereotyping, or constituted explicitly different activity directed at men
and women.7
This possibility, while foreign to the conception of sexual harassment law in
also reviewing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the states).
5. See L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment as Discrimination “Because of . . . Sex”: Have We Come
Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV 439, 457-80 (2001) (reviewing cases in which lower courts applied
the “because of. . .sex” requirement and came to different conclusions about the motivations of the
accused harassers).
6. Hébert, supra note 5, at 480-83; L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 573-76 (1995) [hereinafter Gender Harassment].
7. While these may not be the only ways in which to prove that harassment occurred “because
of . . . sex,” these are the ways in which the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, have
indicated that discrimination based on sex can be shown. In Oncale, 523 U.S.at 80-81, the Court
indicated that harassment could be shown to be based on sex in the following manner:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most malefemale sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals
would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would
be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that
the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might
reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sexspecific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex
harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence about how the
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever
evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the
conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually
constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.”
Id. at 80-81. And in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), a majority of the members of the
Court acknowledged that acting on the basis of sexual stereotypes constituted discrimination on the
basis of gender. Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”); Id. at 272-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing evidence of reliance on sex
stereotyping as evidence of discriminatory intent with respect to challenged employment decision).
Even the dissent in the Price Waterhouse case acknowledged that “[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers
of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.” Id. at 294
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
I do not mean to suggest that sexually explicit denigrating conduct is not in fact based on one of
these motivations or otherwise not based on sex, only that so many courts have reached the contrary
conclusion that alternatives methods of establishing the existence of actionable sexual harassment
may avoid the difficulties that plaintiffs often have in convincing courts of the unlawfulness of the
conduct directed against them.
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the United States,8 is consistent with the law in a number of jurisdictions outside
the United States. A number of those jurisdictions prohibit both sexual
harassment and “moral harassment.” Prohibited sexual harassment is generally
defined as involving conduct that is sexual in nature, although the harm sought
to be prevented is not focused on discrimination so much as on harm to dignity.9
Claims of moral harassment seek to regulate derogatory or denigrating
workplace conduct more generally, reaching beyond conduct that is sexual in
nature or discriminatorily motivated. Although the precise definition of moral
harassment differs among jurisdictions, the jurisdictions that recognize such a
claim generally define the prohibited conduct as conduct directed at a
subordinate or co-worker that has the purpose or effect of injuring the dignity of
that employee or adversely affecting his or her employment conditions or
opportunities.10 In those jurisdictions, a showing of actionable harassment does

8. Courts in the United States have expressed concern that prohibiting harassment
independent of a discriminatory motivation would turn Title VII into a “general civility code.” See,
e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (“Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for samesex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But
that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by
careful attention to the requirements of the statute.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (“These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does
not become a ‘general civility code.’ Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking ‘the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing.’”) (citations omitted). Similar concerns have been expressed by the
lower courts. See, e.g., Terry v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 2010 WL 3860369, *2 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
(“Title VII is not a federal general civility code or a general prohibition against all bad acts.”); Wilson
v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 759 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Title VII is not a civility code.”).
The courts have not, however, adequately explained the dangers or risks of a requirement of civility
in the workplace.
9. See, for example, Belgium’s prohibition on sexual harassment, which prohibits: “all types of
verbal, non-verbal, or physical behavior of a sexual nature, which the guilty party knows or should
know will affect the dignity of women and men in the workplace.” Loi relative à la protection contre
la violence et le harcèlement moral ou sexuel au travail [Law Concerning Protection against Violence
and Moral or Sexual Harassment at Work] of June 11, 2002, MONITEUR BELGE [MB] [Official Gazette
of Belgium], June 22, 2002, 28521. This is an unofficial translation by the author of the original French:
« toute forme de comportement verbal, non-verbal ou corporel de nature sexuelle, dont celui qui s’en
rend coupable, sait ou devrait savoir, qu’il affecte la dignité de femmes et d’hommes sur les lieux de
travail ». Unless otherwise indicated, all translations offered in this article are unofficial translations
by the author.
10. Belgium’s prohibition on moral harassment prohibits “abusive and repeated conduct, from
sources external or internal to the enterprise or institution, that are manifested particularly in
behavior, words, threats, actions, gestures, or unilateral writings, having the purpose or effect of
harming the personality, the dignity, or the physical or psychological integrity of a worker or other
person to whom the present chapter applies, during the execution of his or work, and putting in
danger his or work or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive
environment.” Id. In the original French: « les conduites abusives et répétées de toute origine, externe
ou interne à l’entreprise ou l’institution, qui se manifestent notamment par des comportements, des
paroles, des intimidations, des actes, des gestes et des écrits unilatéraux, ayant pour objet ou pour
effet de porter atteinte à la personnalité, la dignité ou l’intégrité physique ou psychique d’un
travailleur ou d’une autre personne à laquelle le présent chapitre est d’application, lors de l’exécution
de son travail, de mettre en péril son emploi ou de créer un environnement intimidant, hostile,
dégradant, humiliant ou offensant ».
For a discussion of Belgium’s law concerning moral harassment, see Loïc Lerouge, Moral Harassment
in the Workplace: French Law and European Perspectives, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 109, 137-43 (2010)
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not require that the harassment be shown to have been inflicted with a
discriminatory motive or effect, but merely requires a showing of either intent to
harm or sufficient injury.
This article will explore whether recognition of a claim of sexual harassment
focused on dignity rather than discrimination, or even of a gender-neutral claim
of harassment, similar to a claim of moral harassment in France, might be
possible within the scope of the American legal system, either as a substitute for,
or a supplement to, the presently recognized claim of discriminatory harassment
under Title VII. In so doing, this article will explore the historical and cultural
differences that have led to the development of these disparate approaches in the
United States and in France, as well as the challenges that would have to be faced
in attempting to import aspects of such a discrimination-neutral or genderneutral claim of harassment into the law of the United States.
II. FRANCE’S LAW OF SEXUAL AND MORAL HARASSMENT
The current state of the law with respect to sexual and moral harassment in
France reflects the historical development of that law within France, including
some quite recent events, as well as the influence of the requirements imposed on
France and French law by its membership in the European Union. Because the
theoretical basis for harassment law as it originally developed within French law
differs from the basis for harassment law as required to be incorporated into
French law by European Union directives, there appear to be two distinct types
of both sexual harassment and moral harassment recognized in French law. In
addition, the law concerning sexual harassment and the law concerning moral
harassment still differ substantially from each other, in spite of some attempts to
harmonize those different laws.
A. The Prohibitions of Sexual Harassment
The prohibitions of sexual harassment appear in both the Penal Code (Code
Pénal) and the Labor Code (Code du Travail). France’s original provision
concerning sexual harassment was enacted in 1992,11 as part of the Penal Code,
and amended in 1998,12 so that the prohibition read as follows:
The fact of harassing others by issuing orders, uttering threats, using force, or
exerting serious pressure, with the goal of obtaining favors of a sexual nature by
a person abusing the authority granted by his or her duties, is punishable by a
term of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 francs.13

[hereinafter Moral Harassment in the Workplace].
11. Loi 92-684 du 22 juillet 1992 portant réforme des dispositions du code pénal relatives à la
répression des crimes et délits contre les personnes [Law 92-684 of July 22, 1992 concerning the
reform of the penal code relative to the prosecution of crimes against persons], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 23, 1992, p. 9875.
12. Loi 98-468 du 17 juin 1998 relative à la prévention et à la répression des infractions sexuelles
ainsi qu’à la protection des mineurs [Law 98-468 of June 17, 1998 on the prevention and punishment
of sexual offenses and the protection of minors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 18, 1998, p.9255.
13. This is an unofficial translation by the author of the original French: « Le fait de harceler
autrui en donnant des ordres, proférant des menaces, imposant des contraintes ou exerçant des
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A similar provision was included in the French Labor Code in 1992. That
provision originally provided that:
No employee shall be sanctioned or dismissed for having submitted or having
refused to submit to acts of harassment from an employer, from its
representative, or from any person who, by abusing his or her authority
conferred by his or her duties, has given orders, made threats, imposed force, or
exercised pressure of any nature on the employee with the goal of obtaining
favors of a sexual nature for his or her benefit or the benefit of a third party.14

By their terms, these provisions characterized sexual harassment as acts
motivated by the goal of “obtaining favors of a sexual nature,” rather than by
some other purpose, and restricted harassment to actions taken by a person
abusing his or her authority, thereby prohibiting sexual harassment only when it
occurred within a system of hierarchy, such as that existing between a superior
and a subordinate within the context of the workplace.15 The focus of these
provisions on the abuse of authority through specified types of coercive action
and the goal of obtaining sexual “favors,” as well as the placement of the Penal
Code provision in the portion of the code addressing forms of sexual violence
and aggression, including rape, suggests that the basis of these original
provisions was to protect women from sexual coercion, whether that coercion
was accomplished by physical or other types of constraints.16
The cases decided under this version of the sexual harassment provisions
indicate that the existence of coercion, including both promises of benefits and
threats of harm, was an essential aspect of a claim of sexual harassment. In a
decision by the criminal division of the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation,
chamber criminelle), the highest court in the French judiciary,17 the court upheld

pressions graves dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle, par une personne abusant de
l’autorité qui lui confèrent ses fonctions, est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 100 000 F
d’amende. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33 (version in effect from June 18, 1998, to Jan. 1, 2002).
14. Loi 92-1179 du 2 novembre 1992 relative à l’abus d’autorité en matière sexuelle dans les
relations de travail et modifiant le code du travail et le code de procédure pénale [Law 92-1179 of
November 2, 1992 on the abuse of power in sexual matters in employment relationships and
modification of the labor code and code of criminal procedure] ; JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 4, 1992, p.15255, art. L. 122-46.. In the original
French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné ni licencié pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir les
agissements de harcèlement d’un employeur, de son représentant ou de toute personne qui, abusant
de l’autorité que lui confèrent ses fonctions, a donné des ordres, proféré des menaces, imposé des
contraintes or exercé des pressions de toute nature sur ce salarié dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de
nature sexuelle à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers. »
15. Id.
16. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240
QPC,
May
4,
2012,
2-3,
available
at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf (discussing the placement of the
prohibition on sexual harassment in the section of the Penal Code dealing with sexual aggression and
other offenses committed with moral or physical constraints).
17. The function of the Court of Cassation is to review decisions of the lower courts in order to
determine whether those decisions have accurately applied the law to the facts of those cases. The
Court does not resolve the merits of a dispute but generally proclaims whether the lower court
decision is in compliance with the law, in which case it is accepted, or not in compliance with the law,
in which case it is rejected and generally returned to the lower court. Cour de cassation, About the
Court, COURDECASSATION.FR, http://www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court_9256.html (last
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the decision of the court of appeals concluding that sexual harassment had
occurred based on both promises of benefits if the target of harassment had sex
with her supervisor, and also threats of disadvantage if she continued to refuse;
the court of appeals had found sexual harassment to have been established even
though the target of harassment had continued to progress in her career at the
company in spite of her refusal to submit to the harasser’s sexual advances,
noting that the harasser had intended to keep her in his service in order to
achieve his goals of obtaining sexual acts from her.18 Similarly, in another
decision, the criminal division of the Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s
conclusion that a manager had engaged in sexual harassment by giving a
subordinate a promotion when she agreed to have sex with him and then
relegating her to cleaning toilets when she refused to continue the relationship.19
Some courts seem to have interpreted the concept of the coercive action
required to prove sexual harassment quite broadly, to include abusive action by
the harasser aimed at accomplishing the submission to sexual acts by the target
of harassment. For example, the Court of Appeals of Paris held that acts of
harassment could include, in addition to touching imposed on an employee,
words spoken with the object of obtaining sexual acts, including professional and
sexual denigration and threats, insults, and abuse of all kinds uttered in the event
of a refusal to grant sexual favors.20
Conversely, the absence of coercion, even when unwanted sexual advances
occurred in the context of a hierarchical workplace relationship, was deemed
fatal to a sexual harassment claim. Accordingly, in another case, the criminal
division of the Court of Cassation upheld the court of appeals’ dismissal of
claims of sexual harassment against a manager who was found to have made
repeated sexual advances to a subordinate in whom the court noted he had a
sexual interest, including “forgetting” to rent a second hotel room on a business
trip and therefore inviting her to share his single bed.21 The court of appeals had
noted the absence of “blackmail” and had indicated that “an attitude of
seduction, even devoid of tact and delicacy, does not constitute the offense of
harassment, no more than simple conventional social signals initiated in a
fashion to express the demonstration of an inclination.”22 This case seems to

visited October 6, 2013). The English translation of the word “cassation,” in the context of a decision
or a judgment, is “annulment” or “quashing.” HARRAP’S DICTIONNAIRE JURIDIQUE, FRANÇAISANGLAIS 19 (Dalloz 2004).
18. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 20, 2002, No. 0281.635,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007602905&fastReqId=1375350769&fastPos=1 (concerning acts of harassment occurring between
1995 and 1999).
19. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Feb. 18, 2004, No. 0383.302,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007614704&fastReqId=525365472&fastPos=1 (concerning acts of harassment occurring between
1995 and 1997).
20. Cour d’Appel[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 18 e ch.., 18 Jan. 1996, reported in Michel
Miné & Francis Saramito, Le harcèlement sexuel, DROIT OUVRIER, Février 1997, at 76-77 .
21. Id.
22. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 19, 2005, No. 04-
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confirm the terms of the statute that it was not enough that the advances and
other conduct be unwanted and without the consent of the target of harassment;
instead, this version of the prohibition on sexual harassment required some
showing of coercion, whether physical, psychological, or economic.
The use of the term “harassment” (harcèlement) in the prohibition of sexual
harassment raised a question whether the actions on which a claim was based
had to be repeated in order to be unlawful under the statute, even though the
discussion in the Senate at the time the term “harassment” was added to the
Penal Code provision indicated that the legislators anticipated that even a single
act could constitute actionable harassment.23 In fact, some objection was made to
the use of that term as being insufficiently precise because the dictionary
definition of the French verb « harceler » (to harass) included the concept of
repetition.24 That term was apparently adopted in spite of this objection because
of the general acceptance of that term to describe the offense being prohibited.25
It is not entirely clear how, or whether, this issue was resolved by the judiciary in
applying the statute. The court of appeals, in at least one case involving an
employee who contended that she was discharged for reporting a single act of
83.443,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT00
0007611862&fastReqId=1538106140&fastPos=1 (concerning events occurring in 2000). In the original
French : «une attitude de séduction même dénuée de tact ou de délicatesse ne saurait constituer le
délit de harcèlement, pas davantage que de simples signaux sociaux conventionnels lancés de façon à
exprimer la manifestation d’une inclination ».
23. See Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, at 2627-28 (discussion suggesting that single act, such as sexual blackmail,
would be sufficient to state a claim of harassment under proposed provision). See also Damien Roets,
L’Inquiétante métamorphose du délit de harcèlement sexuel, 26 RECUEIL DALLOZ 2059 (2002) (noting that
the parliamentary debate revealed that the intent of the legislators was to permit a finding of
harassment from a single act, but also that the verb « harceler » generally connotates repetition);
Françoise Dekeuwer-Defossez, Le harcèlement sexuel en droit français : discrimination ou atteinte à la
liberté ?, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, ÉD. G., 1993, no. 13, at 3662 (indicating that it was clearly stated in the
parlimentary debates that a sufficiently serious single act, such as blackmail, would qualify as sexual
harassment, and that the term “harcèlement sexuel,” as a French translation of the anglo-saxon term
“sexual harassment,” was chosen for its power of evocation rather than for its semantic precision).
24. Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, p. 2627 (discussing the appropriateness of using the term « harcèlement, »
noting that the dictionary Robert defines the term « harceler » to mean : “to torment, to subject
without respite to repeated attacks, to fast, constant assaults”/In French: « tourmenter, soumettre
sans répit à des attaques réitérées, à de rapides assauts incessants »).
25. Id. (statement of M. Charles Jolibois, indicating that notion of sexual harassment was known
and that “it is indisputable that we should use the term “to harass.”/In French: « il faut
incontestablement utiliser le mot « harceler ».) Even those who opposed use of the term
“harcèlement” noted the general use of that term to describe the offense being prohibited. See id.
(statement of M. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt that “what all the world calls sexual harassment must be
punished”/In French: « ce que tout le monde appelle le harcèlement sexuel doit être puni »).
Interestingly, in spite of the fact that the origin of the English verb “harass” is French, neither the
dictionary definition of the term, nor the common understanding of the term, is tied so directly to the
concept of repetition, at least in the United States. See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 773
(Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., Oxford University Press 2001) (the “core sense” of the word
“harass” is “subject to aggressive pressure or intimidation,” while the “subsense” of the word is
“make repeated small-scale attacks on (an enemy)”).
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harassment of another, concluded that “the law establishes that harassment
results from a repetition of acts and does not correspond to a single act.”26 Most
cases, however, did not state any such requirement, although it is also true that
most litigated cases of sexual harassment did in fact involve repeated acts.27
In 2002, as part of the Social Modernization Act,28 the Penal Code provision
on sexual harassment was modified to remove the requirements that the
harassment occur by certain types of coercive actions and by a person abusing
his or her authority, so that the law simply provided that:
The fact of harassing another person with the goal of obtaining favors of a sexual
nature shall be punished by a term of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of
15,000 euros.29

Similarly, after changes made by the Social Modernization Act and the
recodification of the Labor Code, the provision on sexual harassment, then
contained in Art. L. 1153-1 of the French Labor Code, merely provided:
Acts of harassment by all persons with the goal of obtaining sexual favors for
one’s benefit or the benefit of a third party are prohibited.30

The apparent purpose of this change was to broaden the definition of sexual
harassment to ensure that these provisions were not limited to harassment
accomplished by an abuse of authority and to harmonize the sexual harassment
provisions of the Penal Code with the sexual harassment provisions contained in
the Labor Code, as well as to harmonize the sexual harassment provisions in
both codes with the newly enacted provisions on moral harassment in both
codes.31 The effect of this change was to no longer require that the harassment
occur within the context of a hierarchical relationship, but the amendment also
removed the express requirements that the harassment be accomplished by use
of coercive actions. It is unclear whether this change was intended to remove all
requirement of coercion from a claim of sexual harassment or, instead, to
broaden the notion of the types of constraints that might be used in order to

26. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Angers, soc., June 7, 2011, No. 10/01241,
available at http://legimobile.fr/fr/jp/j/ca/49007/2011/6/7/10_01241/. In the original French : « La
jurisprudence, cependant, établit que le harcèlement résulte d’une répétition de faits et ne correspond
pas à un acte unique. »
27. See Roets, supra note 23 (noting that the law has not been clearly settled on this point, but
that most cases involved repeated acts of harassment).
28. Loi 2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale [Law 2002-73 of January 17, 2002 of
social modernization], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Jan. 18, 2002, p. 1008.
29. In the original French: « Le fait de harceler autrui dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature
sexuelle est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 15 000 € d’amende. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art.
222-33 (version in effect from Jan. 18, 2002, to Feb. 10, 2010).
30. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1 (« Les agissements de harcèlement de toute
personne dans le but d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers sont
interdits. »).
31. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240
QPC,
May
4,
2012,
2,
available
at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf (discussing provisions on moral
harassment in the Penal Code and the Labor Code, discussed in infra text accompanying notes 88103).
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obtain sexual acts from another person.
Cases applying this version of the provisions on sexual harassment indicate
that establishing a claim of sexual harassment required a showing that the
harasser actually was seeking to obtain sexual acts by his or her conduct. The
criminal division of the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of a convicted
harasser that the claim against him had not been established because he did not
have any actual intent to obtain sexual acts by his advances to a subordinate
employee but was only joking, finding his appeal to be merely an attack on the
fact-finding of the lower court.32 The court, however, seemed to confirm that
such an intent was in fact required as an element of the offense.33
The requirement of intent to obtain sexual acts, however, was not
interpreted as a requirement that the harasser be seeking to actually obtain the
act of sexual intercourse.34 The criminal division of the Court of Cassation in
another case rejected the appeal of a convicted harasser who made numerous
sexual advances against a subordinate employee, including asking for kisses and
trying to kiss her, putting his hands under her sweater and on her buttocks, and
talking about sex in an obscene and vulgar manner, but argued that he could not
have been seeking sexual acts because he suffered from erectile problems that
made intercourse impossible; the lower court had indicated that the harasser’s
sexual problems were not relevant to whether his sexual advances constituted an
intent to obtain sexual acts.35 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Paris, applying
the prohibition of sexual harassment, interpreted the term “favors of a sexual
nature” broadly to mean “all acts of a sexual nature, and particularly simple
physical touching intended to fulfill a sexual fantasy or to accentuate or to cause
sexual desire.”36
With respect to the issue of coercion, it appears that the courts still required
that the acts committed to obtain sexual acts be accomplished by means of some
type of coercion, or at least by taking advantage of the vulnerability of
employees. For example, in a case involving a male employee who directed
repeated sexual acts at several female employees, including making sexual
32. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 31, 2012, No. 1182.985,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000025
470967&fastReqId=1778231722&fastPos=1. See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004, Bull. crim. No. 280, p. 1056, No. 03-87.986, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007
069892&fastReqId=1633055263&fastPos=1.
33. Id. See also Cour de cassation [Cass.} [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004,
No. 03-87.986 (reversing decision of court of appeals, which had found a teacher guilty of sexual
harassment for telling a 14-year-old student that he loved her and kissing her three times on the
mouth, because the court of appeals did not explain how his behavior constituted aggressive
behavior with the goal of obtaining sexual acts from the student).
34. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Sept. 30, 2009, No.
09-80.971,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rech
JuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021194011&fastReqId=744822691&fastPos=1.
35. Id.
36. Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, 18 e ch., Jan. 18, 1996,, reported in
Michel Miné, Le harcèlement sexuel, Droit Ouvrier, p 76-77 (Fevrier 1997). In French:« tout acte de
nature sexuelle, et notamment les simples contacts physiques destinés à assouvir un phantasme
d’ordre sexuel, voire à accenteur ou provoquer le désir sexuel ».
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advances, putting his hand on the thigh of one co-worker and trying to kiss her
in the elevator, and placing his head between the thighs of another co-worker
while she was sitting at a table and holding her down on a table while he placed
whipped cream on her stomach and then licked it off, the court of appeals
rejected his contention that his acts constituted simple workplace banter. In
concluding that this conduct constituted sexual harassment, the court of appeals
relied on the fact that the harasser took advantage of the targets of his
harassment, who were experiencing distress because of difficult family
situations. The criminal division of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of
the court of appeals.37 Similarly, although in a case not involving employment,
the criminal division of the Court of Cassation reversed a decision of the court of
appeals that had found a teacher guilty of sexual harassment for telling a 14year-old student that he loved her and kissing her on the mouth three times,
because the court of appeals had not explained how his conduct constituted
aggressive action seeking sexual conduct.38
The expansion of the penal provision on sexual harassment in connection
with the Social Modernization Act was intended to allow the provision to be
applied to a broader range of sexually harassing behavior, but that action
ultimately doomed the provision, for this section of the Penal Code was held
unconstitutional on May 4, 2012, by the French Constitutional Council (the
Conseil Constitutionnel) as insufficiently precise for failing to define the
elements that constituted the crime.39 The Constitutional Council held that the
provision violated the principle that punishment could not be imposed if
criminal offenses were not defined in terms sufficiently clear and precise; the
provision therefore violated both Article 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789.40
Accordingly, the Council declared that the penal provision on sexual harassment
was repealed effective with the publication of the decision in the Official Journal
of the French Republic (Journal Officiel de la République Française) and that the
repeal was effective as to all proceedings that had not been definitively resolved
as of that date.41
The decision of the Constitutional Council addressed only the
constitutionality of the Penal Code provision on sexual harassment, because that
was the issue raised in the application for the priority preliminary ruling on an
issue of constitutionality (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité or QPC) that
was before it. However, the effect of that ruling on the validity of the Labor Code
provisions on sexual harassment seems to have been the subject of some debate.
The Commentary issued by the Secretary General of the Constitutional Council

37. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., May 11, 2010, No. 0984.011,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rech
JuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021194011&fastReqId=744822691&fastPos=1.
38. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Nov. 10, 2004, Bull.
crim. No. 280, p. 1056, No. 03-87.986, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007069892&fastReqId=1633055263&fastPos=1.
39. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-240 QPC, May 4, 2012,
J.O.du 5 mai 2012, p. 8015.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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suggested that the ruling also called into question the validity of the similar
Labor Code provisions, indicating that “[i]f their provisions are not contested,
they are necessarily linked to the fate of the QPC because their content is close to
that of the contested provision.”42 On the other hand, a circular issued by the
Ministry of Justice emphasized that the decision of the Constitutional Council
did not affect the non-penal aspects of the sexual harassment provisions of the
Labor Code, which it indicated remained in effect:
It is appropriate to emphasize, on the other hand, that the decision of the
Constitutional Council raises no objection to the non-penal aspects of the issue. . .
the principle of the ban on harassment, the prohibition of dismissal of one who
refuses harassment or who testifies, breach of discipline [by the harasser], the
obligation of supervision by the employer . . . provided by articles L. 1153-1 to L.
1153-6 and L. 1154-1 of the Labor Code.43

The reenactment of a sexual harassment law, after repeal of the previous
provision, was viewed as a matter of some urgency, both because of the vacuum
created by the absence of a criminal penalty for sexually harassing conduct and
because of the possible implications of that decision on the law of the workplace
more generally.44 Barely three months after the repeal, new provisions on sexual
harassment were enacted into both the Penal Code and the Labor Code,45 with
the unanimous approval of both the Senate and the National Assembly.46 Those

42. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court], Commentaire, decision No. 2012-240
QPC, May 4, 2012, 3, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank/download/2012240QPCccc_240qpc.pdf. In the original French : « Si ces
dispositions ne sont pas contestées, elles sont nécessairement liées au sort de la QPC puisque leur
contenu est proche de celui de la disposition contestée. ».
43. Circular of Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés, CRIM-AP No. 10-780-D2 (May 10, 2012), p.
4, http://www.avft.org/IMG/pdf/Circulaire_10-05-2012_-_harcelement_sexuel-2.pdf.. In the
original French : « Il convient en revanche de souligner que la décision du Conseil constitutionnel n’a
aucune incidence sur l’aspect non pénal de la question (principe de la prohibition du harcèlement,
interdiction de licencier celui qui refuse du harcèlement ou qui témoigne, faute disciplinaire,
obligation de surveillance de l’employeur . . . prévus par les articles L. 1153-1 à L. 1153-6 et L. 1154-1
du code du travail. »See also Christophe Radé, Abrogation du délit de harcèlement sexuel : quelles
conséquences en droit du travail ?, 21 RECUEIL DALLOZ 1392 (2012) (expressing the opinion that the
regime of sexual harassment in the Labor Code is more complete than the Penal Code provision and
that the decision of the Constitutional Council should not be able to abrogate Article L 1153-1 of the
Labor Code, which defines sexual harassment, but only the penalty provision of that Code, Art. L
1155-2).
44. Loïc Lerouge, Actualités, Harcèlement : nouvelle dispositions issues de la loi du 6 août 2012,
Droit Social, N° 10 (Octobre 2012).
45. The new law was not retroactive, but became effective on August 7, 2012, with its
publication in the Journal Officiel, and applies to actions that are committed as of August 8, 2012.
Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM No. 2012-15/E8, Présentation des dispositions de droit
pénal et de procédure pénale de la loi n° 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/1_1_circulaire_07082012.pdf.
46. Communiqué de presse de Christiane Taubira, garde des sceaux, ministre de la Justice
[Press release of Christiane Taubira, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice], « Harcèlement sexuel :
adoption définitive de la nouvelle loi » [English translation] (July 31, 2012),
http://www.presse.justice.gouv.fr/archives-communiques-10095/archives-des-communiques-de2012-12363/harcelement-sexuel-adoption-definitive-de-la-nouvelle-loi-24473.html (noting that both
the French Senate and National Assembly adopted the law relating to sexual harassment with
unanimity and expressing the opinion that the unanimous vote by Parliament sends a strong message
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provisions contain a two-part definition of sexual harassment. The first part of
the Penal Code provision indicates that:
Sexual harassment is the fact of imposing on a person, in a repeated manner,
words or behavior with a sexual connotation, which undermine his or her
dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating nature or create against him
or her an intimidating, hostile or offensive situation.47

The second part of the definition in the Penal Code provides that
incorporated into the definition of sexual harassment is “the fact, even if not
repeated, of using any form of serious pressure with the real or apparent goal of
obtaining an act of a sexual nature, if it is sought for the benefit of the actor or the
benefit of a third party.”48
The Labor Code provisions are similar, incorporating the same two parts of
the definition of sexual harassment from those Penal Code provisions. The Labor
Code provisions on sexual harassment provide that:
No employee shall be required to submit to facts
1. of sexual harassment, consisting of repeated words or behavior with a sexual
connotation, which undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading or
humiliating nature or create against him or her an intimidating, hostile or
offensive situation;
2. incorporated into sexual harassment, consisting of any form of serious
pressure, even if not repeated, exerted with the real or apparent goal of obtaining
an act of a sexual nature, if it is sought for the benefit of the actor or the benefit of

about the fight against sexual harassment).
47. Loi 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel [Law 2012-954 of August 6, 2012,
concerning sexual harassment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2012, p. 12021; CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 222-33(I). In the original
French : « Le harcèlement sexuel est le fait d’imposer à une personne, de façon répétée, des propos ou
comportements à connotation sexuelle qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère
dégradant ou humiliant, soit créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante. »
48. Loi 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel [Law 2012-954 of August 6, 2012,
concerning sexual harassment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2012, p. 12021; CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2. In the original
French : “Est assimilé au harcèlement sexuel le fait, même non répété, d’user de toute forme de
pression grave dans le but réel ou apparent d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit
recherché au profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. » The use of the phrase « est assimilé
au harcélement sexuel » (“is incorporated into sexual harassment” or “is considered to be sexual
harassment”) for this portion of the definition was intended to address concerns expressed that the
definition of the French word « harcélement » connotes repetition, such that a single act could not
constitute harassment ; use of this phrase allows a single act of harassment to be actionable, if the
requirements of the statute are met, while still respecting the dictionary definition of the term).
The reenactment of the sexual harassment provisions into the Penal Code also provided for an
increase in penalties for violation of either part, to a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of
30,000 euros, with enhanced penalties of three year’s imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros for
sexual harassment involving certain aggravating circumstances, such as harassment by a person
abusing the authority of his or her position, harassment of a minor under 15 years of age, abuse of
persons who are particularly vulnerable because of a number of personal or economic situations, if
that vulnerability is known or apparent to the harasser, and harassment accomplished by several
persons acting together. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33(III).
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a third party.49

The Labor Code also includes other provisions relating to sexual
harassment. For example, the Labor Code provides that employees may not be
discriminated against or be subjected to adverse action in connection with
employment decisions because the individual submitted to or refused to submit
to harassing conduct, even if the harassing conduct did not consist of repeated
actions;50 employees also may not be discriminated against or subject to adverse
employment action for having testified about or having reported acts of sexual
harassment.51 Another provision of the Code imposes an obligation on
employers to “take all necessary actions with a view of preventing acts of sexual
harassment.”52
The new provisions of the Penal and Labor Codes on sexual harassment
retain the notion from the original version of the law to define as sexual
harassment acts aimed at obtaining sexual acts, although this version makes clear
that some use of coercion is required for actionable harassment, in the form of

49. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1. In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne doit
subir des faits:
1° Soit de harcèlement sexuel, constitué par des propos ou comportements à connotation sexuelle
répétés qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou humiliant, soit
créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante ;
2° Soit assimilés au harcèlement sexuel, consistant en toute forme de pression grave, même non
répétée, exercée dans le but réel ou apparent d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit
recherché au profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. »
50. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-2 (“No employee . . . may be sanctioned, dismissed,
or be subjected to discrimination, directly or indirectly (intentionally or unintentionally) . . . for
having submitted or having refused to submit to facts of sexual harassment as defined in Art. L. 11531, including, in the case mentioned in section 1 of that article, if the words or behavior have not been
repeated.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié . . . ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire
l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte . . . pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir des
faits de harcèlement sexuel tels que définis à l’article L.1153-1, y compris, dans le cas mentionné au 1°
du même article, si les propos ou comportements n’ont pas été répétés. » The Labor Code provides
that violations of this provision are punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 3,750 euros.
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1155-2.
A corresponding provision was inserted into the Penal Code by the law reenacting the sexual
harassment provision. That provision, contained in Article 225-1-1 of the Penal Code, provides that:
“Discrimination consists of any distinctions made between persons because they have submitted or
refused to submit to facts of sexual harassment as defined in Art. 222-33 or testified of those facts,
including, in the case mentioned in section I of that article, if the words or behavior have not been
repeated.” In the original French: « Constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les
personnes parce qu’elles ont subi ou refusé de subir des faits de harcèlement sexuel tels que définis
à l’article 222-33 ou témoigné de tels faits, y compris, dans le cas mentionné au I du même article, si
les propos ou comportements n’ont pas été répétés. » CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-1-1. The penalty
for violation of this provision is three year’s imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros, when the
discrimination consists of the refusal to hire, the sanctioning, or the dismissal of an individual. CODE
PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 225-2.
51. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-3 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or
subjected to discrimination for having testified of facts of sexual harassment or having reported
them.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une
mesure discriminatoire pour avoir témoigné des agissements de harcèlement sexuel ou pour les avoir
relatés. »
52. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-5. In the original French: « L’employeur prend
toutes dispositions nécessaires en vue de prévenir les faits de harcèlement sexuel. »
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any type of “serious pressure.”53 The new law also makes clear that harassment
occurs whether the harasser is motivated by an actual aim to obtain sexual acts
or only appears to be seeking that goal and whether he or she seeks those acts for
his or her own benefit or for the benefit of another. And this provision
definitively resolves the question left open by the prior versions of the
prohibition on sexual harassment: even a single act of serious pressure, when the
aim of that pressure is to obtain sexual acts, is expressly stated to be sufficient to
constitute a legal claim of sexual harassment. Accordingly, regardless of the
dictionary definition of the French verb «harceler» (to harass), the legal definition
of the term “sexual harassment” need not necessarily consist of repeated acts,
when that harassment has the aim of obtaining sexual acts.
But the new provisions also introduce a new conception of sexual
harassment into the provisions of the Labor and Penal Codes, that of the use of
repeated words or actions with a sexual connotation to impair one’s dignity,
through degrading or humiliating conduct, or to create an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive situation for the harassed individual. For this type of sexual
harassment, repetition of acts is expressly required. There is no requirement that
the sexually related acts be motivated by an intent to obtain sexual acts from the
target of harassment or, indeed, any express requirement that the acts be
motivated by any intent at all. Instead, the provision focuses on conduct that
harms the dignity of the target of harassment or subjects him or her to a hostile,
intimidating, or offensive situation. There is also no express requirement of
coercion, in the form of serious pressure or otherwise, in this part of the
definition in either the Penal or Labor Code provisions, although the use of the
term “imposing” in the Penal Code,54 as well as the prohibition on requiring an

53. The nature of sexual harassment set forth in this portion of the definition has been described
as a form of “sexual blackmail” (in French, « chantage sexuel »). See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de
2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, , JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p. 2009 (statement of Mme
Christiane Taubira, garde de sceaux, ministre de la justice, introducing project of law on new sexual
harassment provisions); Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi
24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon, rapporteure de la
commission des lois constitutionnelles, discussing « chantage sexuel »).
54. See Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la
commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du
suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des
femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le
harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 46 (statement of Mme Maryvonne Caillibotte, directrice des
affaires criminelles et des grâces, ministère de la justice, explaining that the non-acceptance of the
victim was an element of the proposed definition of sexual harassment, as reflected in the use of term
“behavior imposed”/in French « comportements imposés ») ; id. at 112 (statement of Mme MarieThérèse Bruguière, expressing the view that use of the term “imposed” was preferable to use of the
term “non-consensual” to refer to the acts constituting harassment, because that would not require
the victim to establish that she had refused the acts).
See also Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu
intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12,
2012, p. 2009 (statement of Mme Christiane Taubira, garde de sceaux, ministre de la justice,
introducing project of law on new sexual harassment provisions and explaining that use of word
« imposer » (to impose) was intended to mean that the victim did not consent to or desire the acts of
harassment but submitted to them, but that there is no requirement that the victim show that she
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employee to submit to harassment in the Labor Code, presumably suggest that
the words or behavior being inflicted on the target of harassment are unwanted.
The same reading is presumably suggested by the notion that the words and
behavior undermine dignity because of their “degrading and humiliating”
nature, because it is difficult to imagine that the legislators thought that
degrading and humiliating conduct would be inflicted with the consent of the
employee.
The conception of harassment reflected in this new definition, however, is
not so much new as borrowed from the definition of sexual harassment found in
the European Union directives on discrimination, which were required to be
incorporated into French law on discriminatory harassment; those directives, as
discussed below,55 also make use of the concepts of violation of dignity and
creation of a hostile or offensive environment.56
One might reasonably wonder whether, by apparently borrowing the
language concerning violation of dignity and creation of a hostile or offensive
environment from the Labor Code provision on discriminatory harassment and,
in turn, from the European Union directives on discrimination on which this
Labor Code provision is based, this current articulation of sexual harassment also
intended to borrow the underlying theoretical underpinning of those provisions,
that is, the concept of discrimination as a motivating factor for the harassment.
But other factors suggest that that is in fact not the case.
In general, French law appears to view the concepts of harassment and
discrimination as analytically distinct, as reflected in the separation of those
concepts in different parts of the Penal and Labor Codes. The history behind the
original adaptation of the sexual harassment provisions in the Penal Code
demonstrates that this separation of the provisions on harassment and
discrimination in different parts of the Codes was not accidental. As originally
proposed, the provision that became the prohibition against sexual harassment
was located in the portion of the Penal Code on discrimination and did not use
the term “harassment.”57 An amendment in the Senate added a reference in the
provision to the term “harassment,” and the National Assembly moved the
provision out of the portion of the Code on discrimination and into the portion
on crimes of sexual aggression.58
In addition, there was a good deal of opposition to defining harassment as a
form of discrimination under French law at all, as reflected in the fact that the
national government failed to do so until after the issuance of two warnings and
a reasoned opinion from the European Commission to France for failure to

expressed disapproval of the acts in a direct manner).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 105 to 114.
56. Although the word “situation” rather than “environment” was used in the enacted version
of the new sexual harassment provisions, the language initially proposed by the government in the
Project of Law introduced into the Senate was “environment,” which was changed to “situation”
during consideration by the Senate. For a discussion of the likely reason for and effect of this change,
see infra text accompanying notes 81 to 82.
57. Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, Séance du jeudi 3 octobre 1991, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 3, 1991, p. 2627-28.
58. See Dekeuwer-Defossez, supra note 23.
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correctly transpose European Directives on discrimination into French national
law.59 This failure was in part motivated by the existence of different conceptions
of harassment under European Union law and French national law. That is,
while French national law did not consider harassment to be a form of
discrimination, for the European Commission, harassment, or at least sexual
harassment, was inherently discriminatory in nature.60 One of the failures of
transposition for which France was cited was the fact that harassment was not
defined as a form of discrimination.61
That this difference of opinion about the conceptual basis for and the
theoretical underpinnings of a claim of sexual harassment has not been
completely resolved seems to be reflected in the fact that French national law did
not replace its preexisting prohibition of sexual harassment with the one
mandated by the European Union, but simply added what was required by the
European Commission as an additional claim of discriminatory harassment.62 In
fact, although the definition provided by the law transposing the directive into
national law clearly seems to be describing a claim of harassment, the term
“harassment” is not used in the law.63 This continuing tension between
competing conceptions of sexual harassment makes it very unlikely that the
French legislators intended to silently incorporate any conception or requirement
of a discriminatory motive into its “own” version of a sexual harassment claim.
The express provisions of the new statute do not contain any requirement
that actionable sexual harassment be based on any discriminatory motive. The
definition of sexual harassment contained in that new statute references dignity
and the creation of a hostile situation, as well as the concept of coercion of sexual
acts, but not discriminatory motive. In fact, as discussed below, even the
provision of the Labor Code defining discriminatory sexual harassment does not
expressly require a showing of a discriminatory motive, as long as the
harassment has a sexual connotation.64

59. See Marie-Thérèse Lanquetin, Discriminations: le loi d’adaption au droit communautaire du 27
mai 2008, DROIT SOCIAL, Juillet-Août 2008, n° 7/8, at 778. See also Memorandum on “‘Employment
Directive (2000/78/EC)” from the European Union, No. 08/68 (Jan. 31, 2008),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-68_en.htm (list of Member States to which a
reasoned opinion or letter of formal notice will be sent, including France, listed under reasoned
opinion for “[i]ncorrect definitions of direct and indirect discrimination and harassment”).
60. Lanquetin, supra note 59, at 781.
61. Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2007-2008, Rapport d’information No. 252 de Mme Christiane
Hummel, Sénateur, Apr. 1, 2008, p. 11 (discussing the differences between France’s definition of
harassment and the European Union’s preferred definition of harassment). Other failures with
respect to France’s definition of sexual harassment was that that definition required repeated actions,
while the European Directive’s definition did not, and that the notion of degradation of workplace
conditions was narrower than the notion of an intimidating environment. Id.
62. Michel Miné, Discriminations: une transposition laborieuse . . ., Libertés et pouvoirs, Revue
de Droit du Travail, Septembre 2008, p. 532, 533-34 (discussing the potential problems created by the
fact that the different provisions on harassment were maintained in the Labor and Penal Codes).
63. Id. at 533 (noting the fact that the law recognizing certain forms of harassment as a form of
discrimination “curiously does not use the term of harassment”). In the original French: « Grâce au
droit communautaire, la loi permet enfin de reconnâitre certains harcèlements comme des
discriminations, sur le terrain civil, même si la loi n’emploie pas, curieusement, le terme de
harcèlement. »
64. See infra text following note 114.
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In addition, the explanation of the statute in the circular issued by the
Ministry of Justice65 does not reference any requirement that a claim of sexual
harassment be based on any discriminatory motive. That document mentions
discrimination in two different contexts. First, with respect to sexual harassment,
the document addresses discrimination against a person who has been subjected
to sexual harassment,66 which, as discussed above, is also prohibited under the
new sexual harassment provisions.67 Second, that document discusses, in a
separate section, a clarification in the law that makes explicit that discrimination
on the basis of gender identity is prohibited by the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Labor and Penal Codes.68 Tellingly, the provisions on discrimination
because of sexual harassment are codified with the Code provisions on sexual
harassment, while the provisions on discrimination because of gender identity
are codified in the section of the Code that also prohibits discriminatory
harassment. This separation further demonstrates that the prohibition on sexual
harassment under French law is separate from, and not based upon, any notion
of discriminatory motivation.69
The preliminary documents (les travaux préparatoires) of the new statute
also seem to confirm this separation between the notions of harassment and
discrimination. For example, the Impact Study of the Project of Law issued by
the Ministry of Justice with respect to the new sexual harassment provisions
indicate that one of the objectives of the new law was to “reestablish coherence
between the Penal Code and the Labor Code and to distinguish clearly the
question of the definition and penalization of sexual harassment from that of the
definition and penalization of discrimination.”70 The discrimination of which the
study speaks appears to be discrimination against the victims of sexual
harassment, but this language still suggests the desire to draw a clear distinction
between sexual harassment and discrimination. The study also makes clear the

65. Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM No. 2012-15/E8, supra note 45.
66. Id. at 9-12 (discussing provision of new statute providing a penalty for discrimination
against a person who is subject to discrimination resulting from acts of sexual harassment).
67. See supra text accompanying note 50.
68. Circular of Ministère de la Justice, CRIM N° 2012-15/E8, supra note 45, at 12-13 (discussing
provision of new statute providing a penalty for discrimination against a person who is subject to
discrimination resulting from acts of sexual harassment).
69. The provision on gender identity was originally proposed to be added to the new sexual
harassment statute as an aggravating factor for sexual harassment, so that harassment motivated by
one’s gender identity would be punishable by increased penalties. See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire
de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p.2062-65 (discussing
sexual orientation and identity in relation to the vulnerability of the victim and gender identity’s
status as an aggravating factor). That amendment was withdrawn and a new amendment was
proposed, which would add gender identity to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Penal Code
and the Labor Code; that amendment was adopted. Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012,
Séance du jeudi 12 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 2012, p. 2125-29.
70. Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the
project of law related to sexual harassment] 31 (June 2012). In the original French : « rétablir la
cohérence entre le code pénal et le code du travail et distinguer clairement la question de la définition
et de la pénalisation du harcèlement sexuel de celle de la définition et de la pénalisation des
discriminations ».
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government’s position, in explaining why consultation with the Supreme
Council for Professional Equality Between Woman and Men (le conseil supérieur
de l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes) was not mandatory
with respect to the draft sexual harassment law, that sexual harassment is not
discriminatory because, even though it generally affects women more than men,
it can exist without regard to the sex of the victim or the perpetrator.71
Interestingly, however, in spite of the general view among those involved in
the enactment of the new sexual harassment provisions that sexual harassment is
not a form of discrimination, several participants in the process expressed the
view that the existence of sexual harassment within French society and in its
workplaces does implicate issues of equality between men and women. For
example, in discussing the newly introduced project of law relating to sexual
harassment, Madame Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the minister of women’s rights
and the government’s spokesperson, stated: “Indeed, the issue of sexual
harassment is serious; without visible signs that it is considered to be intolerable,
we do not build a society of justice, of respect, and of equality between women
and men.”72 Even more strongly, she asserted the government’s view that
“sexual harassment is a manifestation of a society based on inequality between
women and men.”73

71. Id. at 38-39. A similar desire to draw a clear distinction between sexual harassment and
discrimination is found in the report of the working group created by the Senate in connection with
the consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions, in which the need was expressed to
distinguish between harassment based on gender, seen as a form of discrimination, and sexual
harassment, which consisted of sexual acts. Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport
d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des
lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration
générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et
les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 88 (statement of
Mme Brigitte Gonthier-Maurin, présidente de la Délégation aux droits des femmes).
72. Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
July 12, 2012, p. 2013 (In the original French, «En effet, la question du harcèlement sexuel est grave :
sans signaux visibles qu’il est considéré comme intolérable, on ne construit pas une société de justice,
de respect et d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »). Similarly, when Madame Najat VallaudBelkacem spoke in favor of the proposed legislation to the National Assembly, she indicated that acts
of sexual harassment are intolerable, not only because of the suffering that they imposed on the
victims but that they are intolerable for the entire society to be founded on justice, respect, and
equality between men and women. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012,
Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2365 (In French, « Ces actes sont
intolérables. Ils le sont pour eux-mêmes, pour les souffrances imposées aux victimes, mais ils le sont
aussi pour la société tout entière, la société que nous voulons fondée sur la justice, sur le respect et sur
l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »).
73. Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
July 12, 2012, p. 2045 (statement of Madame Najet Vallaud-Belkacem) (In French, « Madame Meunier,
vous aussi avez rappelé que le harcèlement sexuel est une manifestation d’une société fondée sur
l’inégalité entre les femmes et les hommes. »). Similarly, in her statement to the National Assembly,
Madame Pascale Crozon, rapporteure, indicated that inequality between men and women was a
source of sexual harassment. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du
mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367.
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A similar view was expressed by Madame Christiane Demontès, member of
the Senate and reporter for the views of the Commission on Social Affairs with
respect to the issue of sexual harassment: “[T]he question of sexual harassment
has close ties with subjects that are at the heart of the concerns of the
Commission on Social Affairs. I think of the quality of the life of work, the
prevention of psychosocial risks, and the professional equality between men and
women.”74 And Madame Bariza Khiari, acting as president of the Senate on the
consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions, expressed the view that:
“The Constitutional Council, perhaps unwittingly, gave us the opportunity to
improve the law and harden the repression of sexual harassment to advance
equality between men and women.”75 Perhaps the most strongly stated view of
the connection between sexual harassment and equality or inequality was
expressed by Madame Pascale Crozon, the reporter for the Commission on
Constitutional Laws, who seemed to suggest that not only was sexual
harassment caused by gender inequality but that there was a link between sexual
harassment and sexism: “We must all be convinced that professional equality is
the best prevention against sexual harassment and that the realization of
equality . . . occurs through the prevention of sexism.”76
It should be noted that while the new provisions on sexual harassment
borrow some concepts from the Labor Code provisions on discriminatory
harassment and the European Union directives on discrimination, there are still
important differences between the definitions of sexual harassment and
discriminatory harassment. In particular, the definition of discriminatory
harassment seems to focus solely on the purpose or effect of sexually harassing
conduct, while the new provision on sexual harassment also seeks to define the
74. Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
July 12, 2012, p. 2017 (In the original French, « Par conséquent, la question du harcèlement sexuel
entretient des liens étroits avec des sujets qui sont au cœur des préoccupations de la commission des
affaires sociales. Je pense à la qualité de la vie du travail, à la prévention des risques psychosociaux et
à l’égalité professionnelle entre les hommes et les femmes. »).
But see id. at 2029 (statement of M. Jean-Jacques Hyest) (objecting to the introduction of allusions of
gender into the debate because “the victims of sexual harassment have not been the object of
discrimination; they are all equal, and must be protected equally.” In French, « les victimes de
harcèlement sexuel n’ont pas à faire l’objet de discrimination: elles sont toutes égales, et doivent être
protégées également. »).
75. Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du jeudi 12 juillet 2012, Compte rendu
intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13,
2012, p. 2148 (In French, « Le Conseil constitutionnel, peut-être involontairement, nous a donné
l’occasion de parfaire la loi et de durcir la répression du harcèlement sexuel pour faire progresser
l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes. »).
76. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012,
Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon, rapporteure de la commission des
lois constitutionnelles [reporter of the commission on constitutional laws]) (In French, « Nous devons
tous être convaincus que l’égalité professionnelle est la meilleure prévention contre le harcèlement
sexuel et que la réalisation de l’égalité . . . passe par la prévention du sexisme. »). See also id. at 2374
(statement of Mme Ségolène Neuville, rapporteure de la délégation aux droits des femmes et à
l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes [reporter of the delegation of rights of women
and equality of opportunities between men and women]) (suggesting relationship between sexism
and sexual stereotypes and the existence of sexual harassment).
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nature of conduct that can lead to sexual harassment, by referencing the
“degrading or humiliating nature” of that conduct.77 The Impact Study
accompanying the Project of Law from the Ministry of Justice explained that this
language was chosen to lessen the possibility that the new provision would be
found insufficiently precise by the Constitutional Council; that study explains
that the government believed that a focus on only the consequences of conduct
would not allow criminalization of that conduct, while including requirements
for the conduct itself would avoid any constitutional problems.78 It appears that
the language in the new sexual harassment provisions requires a showing that
the conduct claimed to constitute sexual harassment was in fact degrading or
humiliating in nature, in addition to a showing that the conduct actually harmed
dignity or created a hostile situation.
Differences in language between the two provisions also raise an issue as to
whether a showing of intent is necessary to establish the existence of sexual
harassment under this new provision. The use of the terms “purpose or effect” in
the discriminatory harassment provisions would seem to indicate that no
showing of intent is required, because either an intent or a consequence of
harming dignity or creating a hostile environment would be sufficient. As
explained below,79 that is the manner in which similar language in the moral
harassment provisions of the Labor Code has been interpreted. The effect of the
absence of this language from the new sexual harassment provisions in the Labor
Code is unclear. Certainly there is no express requirement of intent in that
provision, because by its terms, the new provision on sexual harassment merely
prohibits actions that cause harm to dignity or create a hostile environment,
suggesting that the focus is on the consequence of, and not the intent behind,
harassing conduct. Alternatively, the deletion of the term “purpose” might have
been intended to impose a requirement that the harmful effects on dignity and
the work environment actually occur in order for actionable sexual harassment to
be shown, rather than that the actions merely have the intent to bring about those
effects. It is also possible that the deletion of the term “effect” might have been
intended to suggest that sexual harassment cannot be established merely by the
consequences of that conduct, but this would appear to be a strained
interpretation of a statutory provision that contains no express requirement of

77. In the original French, the new sexual harassment provisions refer to acts with a sexual
connotation « qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou
humiliant» et « soit créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante ». CODE
PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33(I); CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1153-1, while the provisions on
discriminatory harassment refer to acts with a sexual connotation « ayant pour objet ou pour effet
une dégradation des conditions de travail susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité»,
CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2; CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-1.
78. Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the
project of law related to sexual harassment] 32-34 (June 2012). Curiously, cited in support of this
conclusion is the fact that the statutory provisions on moral harassment, which also focus on harm to
dignity, have been held to be constitutional by the Constitutional Council; those provisions, however,
as discussed below at infra text accompanying notes 88-103, focus only on the purpose or effect of
harassing conduct, not its nature. It is difficult to understand how a focus on the purpose or effect of
morally harassing behavior would be valid, while a similar focus on the purpose or effect of sexually
harassing behavior would not.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 95 to 96.

Hebert Proof 1 (Do Not Delete)

2/18/2014 11:31 AM

DIVORCING SEXUAL HARASSMENT FROM SEX

21

intent.80
Another difference between the language of the new sexual harassment
provisions and the provision on discriminatory harassment is the requirement
that the conduct create “an intimidating, hostile or offensive situation” against
the target of harassment for a sexual harassment claim, while the discriminatory
harassment provisions require that the harassing conduct create an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment. Interestingly, the
descriptors of “degrading” and “humiliating” are used in the sexual harassment
provisions to define the nature of the conduct that must exist for actionable
sexual harassment, rather than the consequences of that conduct. In addition,
with respect to the consequences of that conduct, the sexual harassment
provisions require the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive “situation”
rather than an “environment.” The addition of the words « à son encontre »
(against him or her) also seem to indicate the requirement of a more direct effect
of the harassment on the particular target of harassment.
An explanation for this difference in language is found in the report of the
working group created by the Senate in connection with consideration of the new
sexual harassment provisions, suggesting that the term “environment” might be
too imprecise and indicating that the term “situation” might more objectively
describe the particular climate suffered by a target of sexual harassment.81 A
similar view was expressed during the debates on the new sexual harassment
provisions, during consideration of an amendment to substitute the term
“situation” for “environment.”82
Although sexual harassment has been prohibited in both the Labor Code
and the Penal Code since 1992, most of the cases applying those provisions have
involved decisions of the criminal courts, applying the Penal Code provision,
rather than decisions of the labor courts, applying the Labor Code provisions.
This is probably not surprising, given the original focus of the definition of
sexual harassment on the abuse of authority and coercion and its apparent links
with sexual violence and aggression. And given that the Court of Cassation
80. With respect to the sexual harassment provision of the Penal Code, a requirement of intent is
likely to be read into the provisions of the statute, similar to what has happened with respect to the
Penal Code provisions on moral harassment, on the ground that harassing conduct cannot be
criminally penalized without a showing of deliberate action on the part of the perpetuator of
harassment. See infra text accompanying note 96.
81. Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, fait au nom de la
commission des affaires sociales (1), de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du
suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (2) et de la délégation aux droits des
femmes et à l’égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes (3), par le groupe de travail sur le
harcèlement sexuel (4), June 15, 2012, p. 10, 91-92.
82. See Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte
rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
July 12, 2012, p. 2040 (statement of M. François Pillet) (in addition to suggesting that use of the word
« situation » was more objective than the word « environnement, » he indicated that the word
« environnement » was only a translation of the English word « environment »); id. at 2051-53
(discussion and adoption of amendment in Senate). See also Assemblée Nationale, Session
Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p.
2361(statement of Mme Christiane Taubira) (explaining why the legal commission preferred the term
« situation » to « environnement »).
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followed a practice of conforming the law concerning sexual harassment under
both codes, it is likely that the focus on the Penal Code provisions resulted in a
more restrictive definition of sexual harassment than might have otherwise been
the case.83 Indeed, one might suppose that this focus on the criminal aspects of
sexual harassment is at least partially responsible for what has been generally
viewed as the chronic underenforcement of sexual harassment law in France.84
While consideration of the new sexual harassment provisions was directly
motivated by the decision of the Constitutional Council to invalidate the
previous version of the statute, it appears that the government used that
opportunity to expand and strengthen the definition of sexual harassment under
French law, at least in part to address the sense that French law had not
previously taken the issue of sexual harassment seriously.85 In doing so, it is

83. See Élisabeth Fortis, Harcèlement moral en droit pénal et en droit du travail, unité ou dualité?, 1482
SEMAINE SOCIALE LAMY 8 (2011) (noting that the Court of Cassation has opted for a unified
interpretation of sexual harassment and that the action has admittedly posed an obstacle to providing
remedies for sexual harassment in the context of employment); id. at 10 (discussing the links between
the offense of sexual harassment and sexual aggression and suggesting that legislators may have
conceived of sexual harassment as a milder form of sexual violence).
84. See Assemblée Nationale, Rapport No. 86 sur le projet de loi (No. 82), adopté par le Sénat
après engagement de la procédure accélérée, relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Report No. 86 regarding
the project of law adopted by the Senate related to sexual harassment], July 18, 2012, p. 13 (describing
survey conducted in 2007 by department in Paris of sexual violence against women, indicating that
45% of the respondents indicated having heard sexist jokes at work, 14% reported being subjected to
pornography at work, and 14% reported having received sexually aggressive verbal advances); id. at
15 (data collected by prosecutors indicate that between 800 and 900 new cases of sexual harassment
were brought each year between 2003 and 2008, but that between 2003 and 2010, there were only 70
to 85 offences each year resulting in condemnation); id. at 22 (statistics provided by the Ministry of
Justice indicate that although a penalty of imprisonment is pronounced in 78% of case of
condemnations, the sentence is usually suspended, and in the 2 to 4 cases each year in which
imprisonment is actually ordered, the average period of imprisonment is between 2 and 3.8 months).
See also Etude d’impact pour le projet de loi relatif au harcèlement sexuel [Impact Study for the
project of law related to sexual harassment] 11-12 (June 2012) (reporting statistics concerning the very
low number of cases in which the offense of discrimination against a victim of sexual harassment for
reporting or refusing to submit to sexual harassment resulted in condemnation between 1994 and
2008); Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012,
Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2372 (statement of Mme Catherine Lemorton, présidente de la commission
des affaires sociales [English translation]) (noting that in a country with a population of 63 million,
there are on average 80 cases a year in which individuals are condemned for sexual harassment).
See also Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2011-2012, Rapport d’Information No. 596, June 15, 2012, p. 31
(Mme Isabelle Steyer, avocate de la Fédération nationale « Solidarité femmes », noting that the former
criminal offense of sexual harassment was little used, partly because it was not understood by the
police, detectives, and judges) ; id. at 94 (statement of M. François Molins, procureur de la
République, indicating that very few cases of sexual harassment result in condemnations, with only
two such cases in Paris in 2010 and only one such case in 2011).
85. This intent is reflected in the discussions in the Senate and National Assembly of the new
sexual harassment provisions. See Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances
du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2367 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon,
rapporteure) (noting that language from the European directives was used in part because those
guidelines cover a very wide spectrum of possible situations of sexual harassment); Sénat, Session
Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance de mardi 31 juillet 2012 Compte rendu intégral,, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 1, 2012, p. 2745
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possible that the new sexual harassment provisions, focusing not just on efforts
to obtain sexual acts but also on degrading and humiliating conduct of a sexual
nature that undermines dignity or creates a hostile environment, may reflect, or
may result in, a fundamental change in the way that sexual harassment is viewed
under French law. No longer linked only to sexual coercion, but instead also
invoking dignitary harm and creation of hostile or intimidating situations, the
broader definition of sexual harassment should be seen to be applicable to a
broader range of conduct and circumstances and more linked, under the Labor
Code, to injuries to the workplace environment.86 In addition, much of the
discussion of sexual harassment by French legislators during consideration of the
new sexual harassment provisions, while not establishing a claim based on
discrimination, seemed to recognize and give credence to the ways in which
sexual harassment implicates and is related to issues of gender equality. It will
take some time, however, to determine how this new statute will be used by
litigants and applied by the courts.87
B. The Prohibitions of Moral Harassment
In addition to the prohibitions of sexual harassment contained in the French
Penal and Labor Codes, those codes also contain prohibitions of moral
harassment. The provisions on moral harassment were enacted as part of the
Social Modernization Act in 2002.88 The adoption of these provisions resulted
from a national discussion of this phenomenon in France, following the 1998

(statement of Mme Christiane Demontès) (indicating the double objective of the text of the new
sexual harassment provisions—to respond to the gap left by the decision of the Constitutional
Council invalidating the law and to bring the definition of sexual harassment in French law closer to
the approach of the European directives). See also Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de
2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2382 (statement of
Mme. Sonia Lagarde) (suggesting that the abrogation of the sexual harassment law by the
Constitutional Council might be used to address the fact that sexual harassment has not always been
addressed with the seriousness that is required).
86. There are indications in the discussions surrounding the enactment of the new sexual
harassment provisions that the new definitions might lead to an understanding of sexual harassment
under French law less focused on solely harm to the individual and more focused on the systemic
harms caused to the workplace in general, similarly to the way that moral harassment is viewed,
leading to an obligation on the part of the employer to prevent the risks associated with sexual
harassment. Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet
2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2427 (statement of Mme Pascale Crozon).
87. Because the statute is not retroactive, judicial pronouncements on the meaning of the new
statute will have to await cases that arise on or after August 8, 2012. Cases involving sexual
harassment presently being decided by the Court of Cassation involve situations from 2008 and
earlier; current sexual harassment cases from the Courts of Appeals addressing issues of sexual
harassment involve situations that arose three to four years before the enactment of the current
student. See review of cases from Legifrance.gouv.fr, a public service that makes judicial decisions
publicly available on an electronic basis (last visited October 6, 2013).
88. Loi 2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale [Law 2002-73 of January 17, 2002 of
social modernization], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Jan. 18, 2002, p. 1008, Art. 169, p. 1043. The provision was originally codified in Art. L 12249 before recodification of the Labor Code, effective May 1, 2008. Ordonnance No. 2007-329 du mars
2007 relative du code du travail (Mar. 12, 2007).
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publication of a book by psychiatrist Marie-France Hirigoyen titled Le harcèlement
moral: la violence perverse au quotidien.89 She defined moral harassment in the
context of the workplace as “all abusive conduct manifested particularly by
behavior, words, acts, gestures or writings, which are capable of undermining
the personality, dignity or the physical or mental integrity of a person,
endangering his or her employment, or degrading the workplace atmosphere.”90
In addition to adopting her label for this experience, many of the concepts
expressed in her definition of moral harassment were ultimately included in the
legal prohibitions of the offense, including the notions of degradation of
workplace conditions and endangering of employment, undermining physical
and mental integrity, and harming dignity.
The provisions on moral harassment are contained in Art. 222-33-2 of the
Penal Code and Art. L. 1152-1 to 1152-6 of the Labor Code. This portion of the
Penal Code provides that:
The fact of harassing another by repeated acts having the purpose or effect of
deteriorating his or her working conditions and that are likely to violate his or
her rights and dignity, impair his or her physical or mental health or jeopardize
his or her professional future, is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a
fine of 30,000 euros.91

Similarly, article L. 1152-1 of the French Labor Code provides that “No

89. Marie-France Hirigoyen, LE HARCELEMENT MORAL : LA VIOLENCE PERVERSE AU QUOTIDIEN
(Syros 1998). For a discussion of the origins of the French law of moral harassment, see Moral
Harassment in the Workplace, supra note 10, at 114-19.
90. Hirigoyen, supra note 91, at 55. In the original French: « toute conduite abusive se
manifestant notamment par des comportements, des paroles, des actes, des gestes, des écrits, pouvant
porter atteinte à la personnalité, à la dignité ou à intégrité physique ou psychique d’une personne,
mettre en péril l’emploi de celle-ci ou dégrader le climat de travail. »
91. CODE PÉNAL [C. PEN.] art. 222-33-2. In the original French: « Le fait de harceler autrui par
des agissements répétés ayant pour objet ou pour effet une dégradation des conditions de travail
susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité, d’altérer sa santé physique ou mentale ou de
compromettre son avenir professionnel, est puni de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 €
d’amende. » Before the enactment of the new Penal Code provision on sexual harassment, the
criminal penalty associated with moral harassment, like that of sexual harassment, was one year’s
imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 euros. However, the penalty associated with moral harassment is
not subject to enhancement based on aggravating circumstances, as is the penalty associated with
sexual harassment. See discussion of sexual harassment penalties in note 48, supra.
After the sexual harassment provision of the Penal Code was declared unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Council, the Court of Cassation was asked to submit a QPC to the Council on the
constitutionality of the Penal Code provisions on moral harassment. Both the criminal division and
the social division of the Court of Cassation refused to do so, concluding that it was not necessary
because the Constitutional Council had already declared those provisions to be in conformity with
the Constitution in its decision of January 12, 2002 concerning the Social Modernization Act, Conseil
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2001-455 DC, Rec. 49. The Court of Cassation
held that the Penal Code provision on moral harassment was not affected by the decision of the
Constitutional Council concerning the sexual harassment provision. Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] crim., July 11, 2012, Bull. crim., No. 170, No. 11-88114, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000026
181166&fastReqId=722333599&fastPos=1; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] soc., July 11, 2012, Bull. civ. V, No. 220, No. 12-40051, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000026
183102.
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employee shall be subjected to repeated actions of moral harassment, which have
the purpose or effect of deteriorating working conditions and that are likely to
violate his or her rights and dignity, impair his or her physical or mental health
or jeopardize his or her professional future.”92 The Labor Code contains
additional provisions similar to the additional provisions relating to sexual
harassment. For example, the provisions on moral harassment prohibit an
employee from being discriminated against or subjected to adverse employment
action for having submitted to or having refused to submit to repeated acts of
moral harassment, or for having reported or having testified about those acts.93
Employers are also under an obligation to take “all necessary actions with a view
of preventing acts of moral harassment.”94
Cases applying the Labor Code provisions on moral harassment confirm the
statutory language indicating that repeated acts constitute moral harassment
when they have the “purpose or effect” of the deterioration of working
conditions, such that actionable moral harassment can exist without regard to the
intention of the harasser; the social division (chambre sociale) of the Court of
Cassation has so held.95 Interestingly, although the provision on moral
harassment in the Penal Code uses exactly the same language with respect to
“purpose or effect,” in both an earlier and a subsequent decision, the criminal
division of the Court of Cassation confirmed the holding of the court of appeals
that the criminal offense of moral harassment must involve intentional action on
the part of the perpetrator of harassment.96

92. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-1 (In the original French: «Aucun salarié ne doit
subir les agissements répétés de harcèlement moral qui ont pour objet ou pour effet une dégradation
de ses conditions de travail susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits et à sa dignité, d’altérer sa santé
physique ou mentale ou de compromettre son avenir professionnel.»).
93. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-2 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or
subjected to discriminatory measures for having submitted or having refused to submit to acts of
repeated moral harassment or for having testified of those acts or having reported them.”). In the
original French : « Aucun salarié . . .ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une mesure
discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte, . . . pour avoir subi ou refusé de subir des agissements répétés
de harcèlement moral ou pour avoir témoigné de tels agissements ou les avoir relatés. » The
violation of this provision is punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 3,750 euros. CODE
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1155-2.
94. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1152-4. In the original french : « L’employeur prend
toutes dispositions nécessaires en vue de prévenir les agissements de harcèlement moral. »
95. Cour de cassation [Cass. soc.,] [supreme court for judicial matters] Nov. 10, 2009, Bull. civ. V,
No.
248,
No.
08-41497,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000021270373; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] soc., Jan. 28, 2010, No. 08-42616, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000021768871. See Loïc Lerouge, La constitution du harcèlement
moral au travail indépendamment de l’intention de son auteur, note sous Cass. Soc. 10 nov. 2009 n° 0841.497, Petites Affiches, n° 28, 9 février 2010, p. 18-21 (discussing how the reliance of the Court of
Cassation on the “purpose” or “effect” language of the Labor Code provision on moral harassment
resulted in the conclusion that moral harassment exists without regard to the intention of the
harasser, thereby significantly enlarging the scope of actions that might be found to be moral
harassment.
96. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., June 21, 2005, Bull.
crim., No. 187, p. 661, No. 04-86936, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte= JURITEXT000007069102&dateTexte=; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters] crim., June 8, 2010, No. 10-80570, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
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This willingness of the Court of Cassation to allow the same language in the
Penal Code and the Labor Code to be interpreted differently with respect to
moral harassment contrasts sharply with the attitude of the Court toward the
sexual harassment provisions. This suggests that the fact that criminal courts
applying the Penal Code are likely to be more restrictive than labor courts
applying the Labor Code will not result, as has been true of sexual harassment, in
a restrictive reading of the moral harassment provisions of the Labor Code. In
fact, the cases decided under the Labor Code provisions, as discussed below,
seem to support this assumption. The relatively broader reading of the
provisions on moral harassment as compared with the provisions on sexual
harassment also likely reflects the fact that the majority of cases dealing with
moral harassment have been decided by labor courts under the Labor Code,
rather than by criminal courts under the Penal Code, unlike cases dealing with
sexual harassment.
For example, the courts have confirmed that as long as the deterioration of
working conditions has occurred, a claim of actionable moral harassment
requires only that the harassing conduct is likely to cause the harms specified in
the statute, not that it actually caused those harms. Accordingly, the criminal
division of the Court of Cassation held that harassment need not take place
within the context of a hierarchical relationship in order to violate the statute, in
that moral harassment can be established even if the harasser is a workplace
subordinate of the target of harassment without the actual authority to bring
about harm to one’s professional future.97
The social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the court of appeals’
attempt to limit actionable moral harassment to acts that occur over an extended
period of time, concluding that a subordinate who was subjected to degrading
working conditions and denigrating comments over a short period of time could
still establish the existence of moral harassment.98 However, the social division of

affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000022457458&fastReqId=1643918403&
fastPos=1 (noting the court of appeals reliance on the harasser’s deliberate action exceeding his
powers of management and its characterization of all of the elements of the offense, including that of
intention on the part of the harasser).
See also Françoise Champeaux, Les mutations du harcèlement moral, 1482 SEMAINE SOCIALE LAMY 2
(2011) (discussing the duality of the penal law and the labor law of moral harassment with respect to
the issue of intention, noting that the offense of harassment is an intentional offense, « un délit
intentionnel, » with intent to commit the act of harassment being an element of the infraction); Fortis,
supra note 85 (discussing duality of definition of moral harassment in the Labor Code and the Penal
Code, given that Court of Cassation held that moral harassment can exist independent of the
intention of the harasser, while the Penal Code retains as an element of moral harassment the
existence of intentional or reckless conduct).
97. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 6, 2011, Bull. crim.,
No.
249,
No.
10-82266,
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000025119012&fastReqId=25775373&fastPos=1
(reversing decision of court of appeals that a subordinate’s action of sending obscene e-mails to his
female supervisor and engaging in other disruptive behavior, ultimately resulting in her suicide,
could not constitute moral harassment without a showing of actual degradation of working
conditions or compromise of her professional future and because he was her subordinate; court of
cassation held that conduct must only be likely to have those effects to be actionable and that the fact
that he was her subordinate was irrelevant to the establishment of the offense).
98. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., May 26, 2010, Bull. civ. V,
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the Court of Cassation did confirm that a single act is not sufficient to establish
the existence of moral harassment, because the statutory language expressly
requires that actions be repeated.99
The social division of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the
court of appeals to find the existence of moral harassment when a supervisor
imposed on his subordinate constant pressure for him to quit his job and
constant reproaches, and refused to communicate and give instructions for his
work.100 Similarly, the social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the
conclusion of the court of appeals that moral harassment had not been shown by
a subordinate’s claim that his supervisor was constantly on his back and
controlled completely his starting and stopping work, refusing even to provide
him time to go to the toilet and to wash his hands, on the grounds that he had
not shown that the deterioration of his health was related to his working
conditions; the Court of Cassation indicated that once the employee established
facts from which the existence of moral harassment could be presumed, it was
the employer’s burden to establish the lack of moral harassment.101
Similarly, the social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the decision
of the court of appeals that moral harassment had not been established in the
case of an employee who was made to work seven days a week for nearly two
years, sometimes for as long as twenty-one hours at a time, and was sent as
many as thirty-three e-mails a day urging her to increase her rate of work, on the
grounds that the court of appeals had not justified its decision by merely stating
that the acts “in themselves” did not constitute moral harassment.102
The criminal division of the Court of Cassation confirmed the court of
appeals’ decision to convict operators of a supermarket of moral harassment

No. 111, No. 08-43152, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000022279684&fastReqId=63530855&fastPos=2.
99. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Dec. 9, 2009, Bull. civ. V,
No. 280, No. 07-45521, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021472025 (ruling that single act of demotion of
employee from business representative to secretary could not constitute moral harassment because
statutory requirement of repeated acts was not satisfied).
100. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Nov. 10, 2009, Bull. civ. V,
No. 247, No. 07-45321, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction
=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000021270312&fastReqId=85430940&fastPos=1.
101. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Apr. 30, 2009, Bull. soc. V,
No. 120, No. 07-43219, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do
?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000020577017&fastReqId=84221230&fastPos=1. This
allocation of the burden of proof is dictated by statute. Article L. 1154-1 of the Labor Code requires
that the employee complaining of harassment establish facts from which the existence of harassment
can be presumed and that the party defending against the claim prove that those facts do not
constitute moral harassment and that the employer’s actions were justified by objective factors
unrelated to any harassment. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1154-1 (In the original French: «le
salarié établit des faits qui permettent de présumer l’existence d’un harcèlement » and « [a]u vu de
ces éléments, il incombe à la partie défenderesse de prouver que ces agissements ne sont pas
constitutifs d’un tel harcèlement et que sa décision est justifiée par des éléments objectifs étrangers à
tout harcèlement »).
102. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Sept. 22, 2010, No. 0941.495.http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte
=JURITEXT000022858175&fastReqId=1882335558&fastPos=1.
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based on their actions toward a number of employees, including whistling to call
employees, demeaning and criticizing them in front of customers, accusing one
employee of maintaining a sexual relationship with a store manager and another
of being an alcoholic, and isolating employees from each other.103
The provisions on moral harassment in the Penal and Labor Codes share
with the corresponding sexual harassment provisions the concept of the violation
of the dignity of the employee subjected to harassment, but contain additional
concepts not shared by the definition of sexual harassment. The moral
harassment provisions focus on the somewhat more tangible harms of
deterioration of working conditions, harm to an employee’s mental and physical
health, and injury to one’s professional future, while the sexual harassment
provisions focus on degrading and humiliating conduct and the creation of an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. Accordingly, while the
underlying basis of the sexual harassment provisions seems to be focused on
preventing harm to dignity, the underlying basis of the moral harassment
provisions appears to be an interest in protecting an employee from unfavorable
workplace conditions and preserving his or her employment opportunities.
C. The Prohibition of Discriminatory Harassment
A third prohibition on harassment is found in the Labor Code in Article L.
1132-1, prohibiting harassment as a form of discrimination. That provision
generally prohibits an individual, in the context of employment, from being
subjected to “discriminatory measures. . . by reason of . . . his or sex” or other
protected characteristics, including age, sexual orientation or gender identity,
ethnicity, religious beliefs, or disability, among others.104 Discrimination is
expressly defined in that article to include discrimination as defined in the law of
May 27, 2008, which adapted certain European Union Directives concerning
discrimination into French national law.105 In particular, discrimination is
defined in that law to include: “[a]ny act linked to one of the motives mentioned
in the first paragraph and any act with a sexual connotation, suffered by a person
and having the purpose or the effect of violating his or her dignity or creating an
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”106
103. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., May 26, 2009, No. 0887.874, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000020767462&fastReqId=816875523&fastPos=1 (denying the store operators relief on the first
grounds for appeal).
104. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1132-1 (In the original French : « aucune salarié . . . ne
faire l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire . . . en raison . . . de son origine, de son sexe, de ses mœurs,
de son orientation ou identité sexuelle, de son âge, de sa situation de famille ou de sa grossesse, de
ses caractéristiques génétiques, de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à
une ethnie, une nation ou une race, de ses opinions politiques, de ses activités syndicales ou
mutualistes, de ses convictions religieuses, de son apparence physique, de son nom de famille ou en
raison de son état de santé ou de son handicap. »).
105. Loi 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit
communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations [English translation], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 27, 2008.
106. Id. (In the original French: « Tout agissement lié à l’un des motifs mentionnés au premier
alinéa et tout agissement à connotation sexuelle, subis par une personne et ayant pour objet ou pour
effet de porter atteinte à sa dignité ou de créer un environnement hostile, dégradant, humiliant ou
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As with the provisions on sexual and moral harassment, the Labor Code
contains other provisions with respect to discriminatory harassment. Employees
may not be discriminated against or subject to adverse action in connection with
employment for having testified about or reported acts of discrimination.107
However, the Labor Code provisions on discriminatory harassment do not
include a provision imposing on employers the obligation to take action to
prevent acts of discrimination or discriminatory harassment, as is imposed on
employers with respect to sexual and moral harassment.
The European Union directives incorporated into French national law
include Directive 2006/54/EC, which makes clear that harassment, including
sexual harassment, is a form of discrimination.108 That directive defines
“harassment” as existing “where unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person
occurs with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive
environment.”109 “Sexual harassment” is defined in that directive as existing
“where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in
particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or
offensive environment.”110 Accordingly, the more general term “harassment”
would seem to encompass non-sexual conduct motivated by or related to an
individual’s sex or gender, while the narrower term of “sexual harassment”
would seem to be limited to conduct with a sexual connotation, but without any
express requirement that the conduct be shown to have been motivated by or be
related to a person’s sex or gender.
Other European Union directives dealing with discrimination that were also
incorporated into French national law by the law of May 27, 2008 specify that
acts motivated by or linked to other protected characteristics also constitute

offensant »). The French Penal Code also contains a prohibition on acts of discrimination, but that
provision does not contain a definition of or prohibition on discriminatory harassment. That
provision defines as discrimination any distinction between individuals because of their sex or other
characteristics, including origin, ethnicity, religious beliefs, disability, or sexual orientation or gender
identity, as well as others. In the original French: « Constitue une discrimination toute distinction
opérée entre les personnes physiques à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de
famille, de leur grossesse, de leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur état de santé, de
leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation ou identité
sexuelle, de leur âge, de leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance
ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion
déterminée.» CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 225-1.
107. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L. 1132-3 (“No employee may be sanctioned, dismissed, or
subjected to discriminatory measures for having testified of acts defined in articles L. 1132-1 and L.
1132-2 or for having reported them.”). In the original French : « Aucun salarié ne peut être
sanctionné, licencié ou faire l’objet d’une mesure discriminatoire pour avoir témoigné des
agissements définis aux articles L. 1132-1 et L. 1132-2 ou pour les avoir relatés. »
108. Directive 2006/54/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in
matters of employment and occupation, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23. That directive provides that
“[h]arassment and sexual harassment are contrary to the principle of equal treatment between men
and women and constitute discrimination on grounds of sex for the purposes of this Directive.”
109. Id. at 26.
110. Id. at 27.
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harassment and therefore discrimination. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June
29, 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin defines harassment as a form of
discrimination that occurs “when an unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic
origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person
and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive
environment.”111 Similarly, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27, 2000,
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation, defines harassment as a form of discrimination on the basis of
religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation “when unwanted conduct
related to any of the grounds . . . takes place with the purpose or effect of
violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”112
The European Union directives and their approach of defining harassment
as a form of discrimination appears to have been heavily influenced by AngloSaxon approaches to harassment law, including the law of the United States. It is
impossible to miss the similarity in language between the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s definition of what is known as “hostile
environment” sexual harassment and the definition of harassment contained in
the European Directives. The regulations of the EEOC define “sexual
harassment” as including “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment.”113 While there are obviously
important differences between those definitions, most importantly the inclusion
in the European Directives of the notion of violation of dignity, it seems clear that
the European Directives were modeled at least in part on U.S. law.114
The Labor Code’s definition of discriminatory harassment appears to create
a two-pronged definition of harassment. First, harassment is defined as acts
linked or related to one of the various discriminatory motives prohibited by the
law, including discrimination on the basis of sex. Accordingly, acts that are

111. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24.
112. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, arts. 1, 2, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 18-19.
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2012).
114. In connection with the enactment of the new sexual harassment law in France, legislators
recognized this similarity and expressed apparent discomfort that the European Union directives
were being used as a model for that new law, indicating the inconsistency between those directives
equating sexual harassment with discrimination, while French law generally does not. See Sénat,
Session Extraordinaire de 2011-2012, Séance du mercredi 11 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégral,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 12, 2012, p.
2032 (statement of Mme Éliane Assassi) (noting that the United States’ approach to sexual harassment
as a form of discrimination has echos in Europe and resulted in the text of the directives/ In French,
« Dans le pays anglo-saxons, notamment aux États-Unis, les actes de « harcèlement sexuel » ont
toujours été appréhendés sous l’angle de la « discrimination sexuelle ». Cette approche du
harcèlement comme forme de discrimination fondée sur le sexe, a eu des échos en Europe et s’est
traduite dans le texte de la directive. »).
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motivated by a prohibited basis and that violate a person’s dignity or create a
hostile or offensive environment constitute prohibited harassment, regardless of
whether those acts have a sexual connotation. In addition, however, all acts that
have a sexual connotation, apparently regardless of whether they are proven to
be linked to the prohibited motive of sex, are defined as harassment, as long as
they have the purpose or effect of violating the person’s dignity or creating a
hostile or offensive environment. It is not clear whether the decision to define
acts with a sexual connotation as discriminatory harassment under this
provision, without an explicit showing of the motivation behind that harassment,
represents an intent not to require evidence of discrimination for these types of
harassment claims or merely a belief that acts with a sexual connotation are
necessarily linked or related to a prohibited motivation, that of sex or gender.
The Labor Code provision on discriminatory harassment would seem to
reach much, but not all, of the same conduct that is encompassed within the
definitions of sexual and moral harassment contained in the other portions of the
Penal Code and Labor Code addressed above, while some conduct would seem
to violate this provision but would not be covered under those other definitions.
Accordingly, this provision seems to be, at the same time, both broader and
narrower in scope than the other definitions of sexual and moral harassment.
This provision is narrower in the sense that, at least with respect to harassment
that does not consist of conduct with a sexual connotation or of a sexual nature,
the harassing conduct must be shown to have been motivated by one of the listed
grounds of discrimination in order to be actionable under this provision.
Accordingly, acts of moral harassment will presumably fall within the scope of
the provision on discriminatory harassment only when they are motivated by
one of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by the Labor Code.
At the same time, while the other definitions of moral harassment explicitly
require repeated actions, and the other definitions of sexual harassment require
repeated actions when the conduct is not directed at obtaining sexual conduct,
the definition of discriminatory harassment does not expressly require that
actions be repeated, to the extent that a single act might be sufficient to violate
one’s dignity or create a hostile or offensive environment. Accordingly, this
provision would seem to cover some instances of both sexual and moral
harassment based on a single, very serious, but not repeated, act considered
sufficient to violate the dignity of an individual or otherwise adversely affect his
or her workplace conditions or environment.
There have been few, if any, cases concerning harassment decided under
this definition of harassment in the Labor Code. The definition of discriminatory
harassment was adopted into French national law at the insistence of the
European Union and it appears not to have been embraced by either litigants or
the courts. It seems likely that this is the case because of the separation in French
law generally between harassment and discrimination.
III. USE OF FRENCH HARASSMENT LAW AS A MODEL FOR A CLAIM OF HARASSMENT
UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
There is a certain irony in looking to French harassment law as a potential
model for a gender-neutral claim of harassment in the United States. First, as
explained above, the new definition of sexual harassment in France was inspired
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in part by the European Directives on harassment, which were in turn inspired
by Anglo-Saxon notions of harassment, including those of the United States.
Accordingly, in some sense, the United States would be looking for inspiration
from a legal concept inspired in part by its own legal system. On the other hand,
the European Union directives, and France, in turn, have introduced a new
concept into its harassment law, that of “dignity,” which the United States’
approach has not encompassed.
A second source of irony in using French harassment law as a model for a
claim of harassment in the United States is that legislators and others in France
have often expressed concern that French sexual harassment law not reflect the
perceived “excesses” of the United States’ sexual harassment law.115 Accordingly,
looking to French law to expand upon the concept of sexual harassment in the
United States might well strike the French as an inappropriate use of their law.
Finally, looking to French law as a potential model for a claim of
harassment within the United States will also require overcoming a similar
resistance on the part of some lawmakers in the United States. Some legislators
and members of the judiciary in the United States have shown a resistance to
looking to foreign law to inform their understanding of law in the United
States.116 This resistance seems to be wrongheaded and provincial; to paraphrase
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, it seems that the worst that
can happen is that nations, courts, and legislatures “might learn something”117
from each other.
What the United States might learn from France is that a focus on the

115. See ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO THE SORBONNE
16, 38 (2003) (discussing the way the French press has trivialized sexual harassment by focusing on
American “excesses” and “puritanism,” and how proponents of the original sexual harassment
legislation in France encountered resistance among legislators “who seemed intent on discrediting
the bill by appealing to anti-American rhetoric, arguing that passing a sexual harassment law in
France would have the undesirable effect of importing ‘American excesses’ of litigiousness,
puritanism, and the Battle of the Sexes”). See also Assemblée Nationale, Session Extraordinaire de
2011-2012, Séances du mardi 24 juillet 2012, Compte rendu intégrale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 25, 2012, p. 2407 (statement of M.
Georges Fenech) (without directly invoking the name of the United States, he expressed the concern
with using language from the European directives on hostile and offensive environments because it
“comes from a culture marked by moral strictness and puritanism”/ In French: «Certes, cette
terminologie est issue d’une directive européenne mais l’on peut se demander, j’ose le dire, si elle
n’est pas surtout issue d’une culture marquée par le rigorisme et le puritanisme. »).
116. See Martha Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United
States, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. Online 1, 2-3 (2010),
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/08/online_52_minow/ (describing controversy over reference of
the law of other nations as recent, with a reference to the need to consult the law of other nations
found in the Federalist Papers and frequent citations to the law of other nations in early decisions of
the United States Supreme Court). The recency of the controversy, however, has not affected the
ferocity of the opposition to references to foreign law; some members of Congress have suggested
that judges who cite to foreign law should be impeached. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 5 (citing Jesse J. Holland, Justice Breyer Says Debate Over Foreign Law is Irrelevant,
LAW.COM, (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PrintFriendly.jsp?id=1202447364424).
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has also challenged the notion that the United States should not seek to
learn from the law of other countries: “We are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about
endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups.” Justice
Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) (quoting Ginsburg, J.).
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discriminatory aspects of sexual harassment—the ways in which sexual
harassment is spawned in part by the existence of gender inequality in the
workplace, as well as the ways in which the existence of sexual harassment in the
workplace creates more gender inequality—is not the only way to approach
issues of sexual harassment. While sexual harassment raises issues of gender
equality, it also raises issues of basic respect for human dignity and autonomy.
To the extent that those issues of human dignity and autonomy are not directly
tied to gender—that women (and men) who are sexually harassed suffer harm to
their dignity and autonomy not because they are women (or men) but because
they are human—a consideration of harms to dignity, separate from a focus on
considerations of gender equality, might well provide an independent ground
for condemning sexual harassment.
To understand whether this is true, it is necessary to understand what is
meant by “dignity” as used in the French laws of sexual and moral harassment.
To make this determination, one might look to a number of sources, including
how that term is used in other legal and similar documents in France and within
European Union nations more generally, as well as the commonly understood
meaning of that term, both in France and elsewhere.
As the term “dignity” is used more generally, the concept of dignity may
not be as much a single concept as a number of related concepts.118 One meaning
given to dignity seems tied to notions of equality, such that each individual is
entitled to the equal dignity as every other individual.119 This concept of dignity
is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which indicates in
Article 1 that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.”120 Under this meaning of the term “dignity,” discrimination itself would
violate dignity, by denying individuals their entitlement to equal respect for their
dignity and rights.
Another meaning given to the concept of dignity is that of autonomy or selfdetermination, such that individuals have the right to make their own decisions
about how to live their lives.121 Still another meaning of the concept of dignity is
the notion of dignity as meriting respect for one’s person. This is a common
meaning given to the concept of dignity, such that humiliation or degradation
counts as a violation of human dignity.122
The concept of “dignity” is recognized in the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights, in Article 1 of Chapter 1 of that document: “Human dignity

118. The right to dignity can also be understood, and is understood in some countries, as a
positive right that provides citizens with a right to a certain level of subsistence consistent with
notions of human dignity. See ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH
OF THE HUMAN PERSON 54-70 (2013) (discussing the theory of “material dignity” and its role in the
constitutions and jurisprudence of various nations). This, however, does not appear to the way in
which the term “dignity” is used within the new French harassment provisions.
119. See id. at 34-35 (detailing the “equality” theory of dignity).
120. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
121. See DALY, supra note 125, at 38-44 (linking autonomy to “full personality development”).
122. See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 127 (2012) (“[T]he idea that
humiliation or degradation counts as a violation of human dignity has a very good claim to be
universal even though the practices by which that may be expressed vary.”).
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is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”123 The Commentary of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union refers to dignity as a
foundational value and indicates that the term “human dignity” in the Charter is
a legal term. The Commentary notes certain definitions given to the term
“human dignity” in case law within the European Union, including the
following definition by the German Federal Constitutional Court: “The term
‘human dignity’ means that the human being has a right to ‘social value and
respect.’”124 The Commentary declares that: “Any measure impairs Article 1 if it
brings into contempt the value which a human being has by his/her being a
person. Measures of this kind would be humiliation, branding, outlawing or
other behaviour which deprives the human person of the right to recognition as a
human being.”125 Accordingly, it appears that the concept of dignity, as used
within the European Union generally, encompasses at least the concept of
dignity as respect and freedom from humiliating or degrading conduct.
The dictionary definition of the French word « dignité » is « respect que
mérite quelqu’un » (in English, “respect that is deserved by someone”),126 as well
as « respect de soi » (in English, “self respect”).127 It appears that the common
meaning of dignity in the French language includes at least the concept of
dignity as respect and freedom from humiliation.
The term “dignity” does not appear in the current French Constitution, that
of October 4, 1958, although the Constitution does refer to other rights
considered to be basic, such as liberty, equality, and fraternity.128 The concept of

123. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 9.
As originally enacted, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union had no formal legal
status under European Union law, the European Commission indicated that it would treat the
Charter as if it were binding and the European Parliament indicated that it would pay particular
attention to whether proposed legislation was in conformity with the Charter. European Union
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union 15 (June 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamentalrights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. However, with the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the Charter became legally binding on the E.U. itself and its member nations. Treaty of
Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, c. 306, vol. 50 (Dec. 17, 2007).
124. European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 26 (June 2006) (citing Sammlung der
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Reports of the Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court], Oct. 20, 1992, 87, 209.)).
125. Id. at 28.
126. PAUL ROBERT, LE PETIT ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABETIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE
FRANÇAISE 482 (1967). One example given in the dictionary for this meaning is « principe de la
dignité de la personne humaine » (in English, principle of the dignity of the human person).
127. Id. One of the examples of this meaning is « manquer de dignité » (In English, “lack of
dignity”).
128. 1958 CONST. Preamble (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution-of-4-october-1958.25742.html (English version)
[hereinafter 1958 Constitution]. The Preamble to the 1958 Constitution declares that: “The French
people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national
sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to
the Constitution of 1946, and to the rights and duties as defined in the Charter for the Environment of
2004.” Dignity is also not mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution of 27 October 1946. 1946
CONST.
Preamble
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946-ive-
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dignity, however, has been incorporated into French law, including into the
Penal Code. In addition to the use of the French word « dignité » in the Penal
Code provisions on sexual and moral harassment, the Penal Code also contains a
chapter titled “Attacks on the dignity of the person” (In French, « Des atteintes à
la dignité de la personne »),129 which includes a prohibition on discrimination,
including a prohibition on discrimination against a person who submits or
refuses to submit to sexual harassment.130 Also included within this chapter is a
prohibition on human trafficking,131 a prohibition on forcing another to conceal
his or her face by reason of sex,132 a prohibition on the promotion of
prostitution,133 a prohibition on the exploitation of begging,134 and a prohibition
on hazing.135
It would appear that the concept of dignity within French law includes
notions of equality of treatment, as reflected in the prohibitions of different forms
of discrimination, as well as the notion of respect or freedom from humiliating
and degrading behavior, as reflected in the prohibitions of human trafficking, the
promotion or exploitation of prostitution and begging, and hazing. The
prohibition of hazing makes specific reference to humiliating and degrading acts.
It is also possible that the prohibition of human trafficking and on forcing
another to conceal his or her face by reason of sex is also aimed at the notion of
dignity as autonomy.
The concept of dignity as respect and freedom from humiliating and
degrading behavior seems to be the meaning of “dignity” that has been
incorporated into the new French sexual harassment provisions, which prohibit
republique.5109.html The term “dignités » is found in the French version of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789, in Article VI, which declares that « Tous les
citoyens étant égaux à ses yeux, sont également admissibles à toutes dignités, places et emplois
publics, selon leur capacité, et sans autre distinction que celle de leurs vertus et de leurs talents. ».
Déclaration des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, available at http://www.assembleenationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789.asp [hereinafter French Declaration]. However, in the English
version of the Declaration, made available on the website of the Conseil Constitutionelle
(Constitutional Council), that portion of the Declaration is translated as: “All citizens, being equal in
its eyes, shall be equally eligible to all high offices, public positions and employments, according to
their ability, and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.” Déclaration des
Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, available at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf (English version). See
also ROBERT, supra note 133 (defining «dignité » as « fonction, titre or charge qui donne à quelqu’un
un rang eminent » /duties, title, or responsibility that gives someone a high rank). Accordingly, it
does not appear that the Declaration refers to human dignity. By contrast, in the first and second
articles of the Declaration, reference is made to principles of equality and liberty. French Declaration,
arts. 2-3.
129. See generally CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] (Chapter V, titled “Attacks on the Dignity of the Person,”
is found within Title II, titled “Attacks on the Human Person” (in French, « Titre II : Des atteintes à la
personne humaine »)). This is found within Book II, “Crimes and misdemeanors against persons” (In
French, « Livre II : Des crimes et délits contre les personnes »).
130. Id. arts. 225-1 to 225-4. The prohibition on discrimination against a person who submits to
or refuses to submit to sexual harassment is found in CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art. 225-1-1.
131. Id. arts. 225-4-1 to 225-4-9.
132. Id. art. 225-4-10.
133. Id. arts. 225-5 to 225-12.
134. Id. arts. 225-12-5 to 225-12-7.
135. Id. arts. 225-16-1 to 226-16-3.
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the use of words or behavior with a sexual connotation against an individual,
“which undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating
nature.”136
The concept of dignity, while not foreign to the law of the United States, has
not played the central role in U.S. law occupied by other foundational concepts.
The Declaration of Independence by the thirteen united States of America refers
to equality, liberty, and happiness, but not to “dignity”—at least not directly.137
The word “dignity” is also not found in the Constitution of the United States.138
This is not really surprising, because the concept of dignity as a foundational
human right is relatively modern, dating from the late 1940s, after World War
II.139
On the other hand, courts in the United States, including the United States
Supreme Court, have invoked the concept of human dignity in determining the
proper application of constitutional provisions. This reliance on the concept of
dignity seems to correspond to the broader global focus on dignity as a
foundational human right, following World War II.140 During the latter half of
the 20th century and the first decade or so of the 21st century, the United States
Supreme Court began to recognize that dignity was implicated in a number of
contexts, including issues of discrimination, privacy, and speech.141
An analysis of the manner in which Supreme Court justices have invoked
the concept of dignity suggests that they have understood dignity as involving
all three of the potential definitions of the term “dignity” described above:
equality, autonomy, and respect. In some cases, equality has appeared to be the
focus of the Court’s discussion of dignity, while in other cases, the members of
the Court seemed to focus more on issues of autonomy or respect.
For example, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy striking down a state statute criminalizing certain same-sex sexual
conduct, seemed to focus more on the notion of dignity as equality when it noted
that criminalization of such conduct even as a low-level misdemeanor,
particularly when similar sexual conduct between members of the opposite sex
was not prohibited, harmed the dignity of those so charged and convicted.142 The
focus on dignity as equality is even more clear in the case of J.E.B. v. Alabama,143
in which then Justice Blackman wrote an opinion on behalf of the Court holding

136. Id. art. 222-33-I ; CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV] art. L. 1153-1 (In French, « qui soit portant
atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère déradant ou humiliant »).
137. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
138. U.S. CONST.
139. See ROSEN, supra note 129, at 2 (noting that dignity played a “vital role” in important
documents from the 1940s, including the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also DALY,
supra note 125, at 1 (“Until the late twentieth century, there was no right to dignity. . .All that
changed in the aftermath of the Second World War.”).
140. See generally DALY, supra note 125, at 82-100 (describing the beginnings of the use of the
concept of dignity in opinions of the United States Supreme Court, in the wake of World War II).
141. Id. at 90-96.
142. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”).
143. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude men from a jury considering a
paternity child support action violated the Equal Protection Clause because
striking male jurors simply because of their gender “denigrates the dignity of the
excluded juror.”144
In other cases, however, dignity as autonomy or as respect seems more the
focus of the Court’s analysis. Indeed, the cases suggest that not all the justices of
the Court perceive “dignity” to have the same meaning or at least the same
meaning in the same cases. In Indiana v. Edwards,145 involving the claim of a
mentally ill criminal defendant who had been denied the right of selfrepresentation in his criminal trial, both the majority opinion by Justice Breyer
and the dissent by Justice Scalia invoked the concept of dignity in support of
their respective, and opposite, positions on the legal issue. Justice Breyer for the
Court indicated that although interests in dignity and autonomy are the basis of
the right of self-representation, allowing a defendant who lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his own defense will not “affirm [his] dignity” because “the
spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as
likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.”146 Accordingly, while the majority of
the Court seemed to define dignity, at least in part, as freedom from humiliation,
Justice Scalia argued that the relevant issue of dignity underlying the right of
self-representation was instead autonomy. He indicated that the “loss of ‘dignity’
the right is designed to prevent is not the defendant’s making a fool of himself by
presenting an amateurish or even incoherent defense,” but was instead “the
supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the
State—the dignity of individual choice.”147 However, even Justice Scalia, in his
dissenting opinion in the case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,148
dealing with the constitutionality of a program of drug testing in federal
employment, seemed to define the concept of dignity in terms of freedom from
humiliation. He called the program of drug testing, which required monitoring
of the process of urination, to be “particularly destructive of privacy and
offensive to personal dignity.”149 And he argued that not only these employees
but the entire society would suffer from this “affront to . . . dignity”:
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the present
exercise in symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity
is thus offended, but all of us—who suffer a coarsening of our national manners
that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content, and who become subject
to the administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly
be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have for their own.150

Accordingly, an incorporation of the concept of dignity into the law of
sexual harassment would not seem to be inconsistent with the values recognized
by American courts, particularly with respect to the notion of dignity as the right
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 142.
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 687.
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to be free from certain forms of disrespectful, humiliating, and degrading
conduct. While the concept of dignity has generally been recognized by the
courts in connection with their interpretation of constitutional provisions, there
is no reason that protection for dignity could not be incorporated into statutory
protections against sexual harassment, as the notion of equality has been
incorporated into statutory protections.
A number of lower courts151 have recognized that sexual harassment can
implicate the dignity interests of the individuals subjected to sexual harassment
in a number of different contexts. The federal judge in Gallagher v. Delaney,152
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, noted that the prohibition
against workplace sexual harassment was based at least in part on considerations
of dignity:
[N]o principled argument supports the view that sex-based offensive behavior in
the workplace is immune from remedy simply because it may be culturally
tolerated outside of the workplace. The purpose of Title VII is not to import into
the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the
workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to
implement the goal of human dignity and economic equality in employment.153

Similarly, a federal bankruptcy judge agreed that a judgment of sexual
harassment against a former employer was not dischargeable in bankruptcy
because the injury was malicious: “Sexual harassment is not only illegal, but so
morally reprehensible and degrading to one’s personal dignity that the harasser’s
conduct cannot possibly be considered anything other than ‘wrongful and
without just cause or excuse.’”154 In the context of a state court judge being
disciplined for his sexually harassing behavior toward his law clerk, the New
Jersey Supreme Court indicated that the conduct was “personally offensive to his
employee and inimical to her dignity, privacy, and emotional well-being.”155
In the context of a claim by a male prison inmate of sexual harassment by a
female prison guard with whom he had had a prior romantic but not sexual
relationship, the federal appeals court judge reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment against the inmate on his Eighth Amendment claim; the
151. Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have recognized a connection between
sexual harassment and dignity, although the precise nature of that connection is not altogether clear
from the language of the case. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
In a case involving claims of same-sex sexual harassment in which the male plaintiff had alleged that
he was threatened with rape and had a bar of soap shoved up his rectum by his male supervisors and
co-workers, Justice Scalia on behalf of the Court noted that “in the interest of both brevity and
dignity” the facts would be described only generally. Id. It is not entirely clear, however, whether
Justice Scalia was concerned with Joseph Oncale’s dignity or the dignity of the Court. Justice Scalia,
however, did note that Oncale had been subjected to “sex-related, humiliating actions.” Id.
152. 139 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 1998).
153. Id. at 342 (citing King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). See also Leibovitz v. New
York City Transit Authority, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (in context of Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment claim by a woman who had not been personally harassed, the court
noted that an environment in which a superior refers to women in vulgar sexual terms “is
demeaning, harassing, and incompatible with the dignity and well-being of all the women in that
workplace”).
154. In re Walter Spagnola, 473 B.R. 518, 524 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
155. In the matter of Judge Edward Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 115 (N.J. 1993).
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court of appeals held sufficient his allegations that the female guard had touched
his groin and reached into his gym shorts to stroke his penis, noting that the
sexual assault on an inmate by a prison guard is “‘offensive to human
dignity.’”156
State legislatures enacting prohibitions against sexual harassment have also
drawn the connection between sexual harassment and dignity. The Tennessee
Human Rights Act, which prohibits sexual harassment in the context of the
workplace, includes within its purposes not only to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sex and other characteristics, but to “[p]rotect [individuals’] interest
in personal dignity and freedom from humiliation.”157 Similarly, the Puerto Rico
statute prohibiting sexual harassment in the context of employment declares that
it is the public policy of Puerto Rico that “sexual harassment in employment is a
type of sexual discrimination and, as such, constitutes an illegal and undesirable
practice that goes against the established constitutional principle that the dignity
of a human being is inviolable.”158
Sexual harassment implicates notions of equality, and therefore might be
viewed as implicating dignity because of the denial of equal respect provided to
others. But sexual harassment may also properly be perceived to be wrong
because it subjects its targets to humiliating and degrading—ultimately
disrespectful—conduct that is contrary to the right of the individual to be treated
with the dignity that all humans deserve, even in the absence of a showing that
notions of equality have also been offended.
I do not pretend to be the first to suggest that the United States seek to
incorporate notions of dignity into its sexual harassment law. In her 1997 article
“Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect,” Professor Anita Bernstein
challenges the use of reasonableness as the appropriate standard for judging
sexual harassment, instead suggesting that the “respectful person” standard be
substituted so that sexual harassment is seen as a form of disrespect and
violation of dignity.159 But Professor Bernstein does not appear to have been
advocating the use of dignity as an independent ground from discrimination for
prohibiting sexual harassment, merely as a method for determining what types
of harassment based on discrimination would violate Title VII’s prohibition on
sexual harassment.160 Under her approach, uncivil and disrespectful conduct

156. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)).
157. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(3-4) (2006).
158. 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155 (2009).
159. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 455-92
(1997) (critiquing the use of the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases as vague,
hollow and gendered).
160. That Professor Bernstein does not see dignity as a substitution for, or alternative to, the
concept of discrimination for actionable sexual harassment claim seems clear from her statement that:
Even when the plaintiff can clear these hurtles [summary judgment and motions to
dismiss], and even when the defendant did not behave as a respectful person, a Title VII
claim might fail under the respectful person standard because of its poor fit with the
antidiscrimination purposes of the statute. Disrespectful conduct not based on sex would
remain outside the remedial boundaries of Title VII, consistent with the view now
prevailing in the courts.
Id.at 505.
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would not be actionable merely because it was uncivil and disrespectful, but only
if it was also discriminatory.
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich (Brooks) in her 1999 article “Dignity and
Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace
Harassment”161 also argued for inclusion of the concept of dignity as a ground
for prohibiting sexual harassment. Her proposal was to use existing tort law to
reach harassment that is not motivated by discrimination, noting that certain
intentional torts, like the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, are
largely based on notions of dignitary harm.162 She, however, is more confident
than I am that the disadvantages of tort law—including a focus on individual
rather than employer liability—can be overcome by public policy arguments, and
that the occurrence of these torts in the workplace will be seen as an aggravating
factor to allow such claims to be more easily made.163 I am skeptical that courts
will interpret common law tort claims to provide substantial protection to men
and women who face sexual harassment in the workplace, particularly in light of
the general view expressed by a number of courts that the degree of
outrageousness required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
for example, is a very difficult standard to meet in the context of the workplace
because a certain amount of distress is a normal part of the workplace context.164
My proposal is more far-reaching. I am suggesting the federal statutory
adoption of the concept of dignity as an independent ground for prohibiting
sexual harassment, in addition to the present prohibition contained in Title VII,
which is tied to discrimination. In a real sense, I am advocating the adoption of a
requirement of civility and respect in the workplace. Or, rather, I am advocating
a prohibition against some forms of uncivil and disrespectful conduct, which
would prohibit sexual harassment even if that harassment was not linked to, or
could not be shown to be linked to, a discriminatory motive on the part of the
harasser or a discriminatory effect on the target of the harassment.
I am not arguing that all forms of sexually harassing conduct in the
workplace that implicate dignity in some slight way be prohibited by federal
law. After all, even when courts find sexual harassment to be discrimination on
the basis of sex, they find it to be unlawful under Title VII only if it is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to affect the terms and conditions of employment of the

161. Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace
Harassment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1 (1999).
162. See id. at 22-32 (explaining the concept of “dignitary harm” in modern tort law and
describing the harm as an injury to “personality interests”).
163. See id. at 44-60 (suggesting that, because the notion of “abuse of power,” which is one factor
that makes a defendant’s conduct outrageous, has been interpreted broadly in sexual harassment
cases involving claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, dignitary harms in the
workplace “could be seen as inherently aggravated”).
164. See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988) (“At the outset, it must
be recognized that it is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will arise to the
level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress.”); Wilkinson v. Hobbs Assoc., No. CV075007485, 2011 WL 3587472, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2011) (“[I]t is clear that individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to
experience some level of emotional distress, even significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct
in the workplace.”) (quoting Perodeau v. Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 757 (Conn. 2002)).
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harassed employee.165 In the same way that discriminatory sexual harassment
might be found to be “de minimus” and therefore not unlawful, sexual
harassment that threatens the dignity interests of employees might also be found
to be actionable only in those cases in which it is deemed to be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to actually affect an employee’s working conditions or workplace
environment—when the affront to dignity creates a hostile, offensive, or abusive
environment.
I would not, however, incorporate a requirement of unwelcomeness into
this proposed prohibition of sexual harassment based on the concept of harm to
dignity. Elsewhere, I have argued against the requirement of unwelcomeness for
claims of sexual harassment under Title VII, on the grounds that such a
requirement places an inappropriate emphasis on the conduct of the target of
harassment rather than the harasser. There is simply no reason to require a
showing that a woman or a man who is sexually harassed in such a way as to
create an offensive or abusive working environment did not consent to, invite, or
solicit that harassment, any more than it should be required that other forms of
discrimination or harassment be shown to have been unwanted.166 Accordingly, I
would not require a showing that sexual harassment that was sufficiently
humiliating or degrading to violate the dignity of an employee was also
unwanted or uninvited by the target of harassment, although in the unlikely
event that a harassed employee actually wanted to be humiliated or degraded, a
court might conclude that his or her dignity had not been sufficiently violated to
state a cause of action.
The experience of at least one other nation in using the concept of dignity as
the basis for the prohibition on sexual harassment does suggest a need for
caution in relying on the concept of dignity as the primary justification for sexual
harassment laws. In her article titled “Stereotyping Women, Individualizing
Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of Sex Harassment Law Between the
Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism,” Professor Noya Rimalt describes her
study of court decisions interpreting Israel’s Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law enacted in 1998.167 She explains how Israeli feminists looked to the
European Union model of sexual harassment and its focus on dignity as a way to
avoid dissatisfaction with some aspects of sexual harassment law, in particular
its focus on notions of formal equality as the measure of whether discrimination
had occurred.168 Even though Israel’s sexual harassment statute referred to both
equality and dignity as grounds for prohibiting sexual harassment, she describes

165. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”).
166. See Gender Harassment, supra note 6, at 577-89 (reviewing the case law interpreting, and
critiquing the rationales for, the “unwelcomeness” requirement).
167. Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of
Sexual Harassment Law Between the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism, 19 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
391 (2008).
168. See id. at 395-410 (reviewing the historical development of Israel’s Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law).
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how courts have prioritized dignity harms over equality harms, essentially
seeing sexual harassment as a harm to individual women rather than as a groupbased harm against women more generally.169 She also indicates that Israeli
courts deciding cases of sexual harassment have taken a paternalistic and
moralistic approach to women complaining of sexual harassment, emphasizing
their need for protection and the moral failings of the men who have harassed
them, ultimately stereotyping women as frail, vulnerable, and in need of
protection from challenges to their modesty and honor rather than their
equality.170
Professor Rimalt suggests several reasons for this negative turn of events,
including the fact that equality was listed as the final of the values supporting
the enactment of the sexual harassment legislation, behind dignity, liberty, and
privacy.171 She also argues that the decision to criminalize sexual harassment was
also partially responsible for these negative effects, because that decision meant
that sexual harassment became associated with other sexual offenses, so that
sexual harassment was thought of as sex activity and the fault of an individual
man, rather than as associated with gender and societal inequality.172
I take seriously the potential risks of a focus on dignity as the justification
for prohibiting sexual harassment to the exclusion of equality. For a number of
reasons, however, I think that there is less potential danger in incorporating
notions of dignity into the sexual harassment law of the United States. In Israel,
the prohibition of sexual harassment is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating
only from 1988.173 By contrast, in the United States, sexual harassment has been
prohibited on a federal level, at least nominally, since 1965 and has been
recognized as a form of sexual discrimination since the late 1970s or early
1980s.174 Accordingly, courts in the United States have generally conceived of
sexual harassment in terms of discrimination; it seems unlikely that
incorporating the concept of dignity as another justification for prohibiting
sexual harassment will cause courts to abandon the concept of sexual harassment
as discrimination entirely, although it is possible that such an action could cause
less emphasis to be placed on discrimination and the aspects of sexual
harassment that are both caused by and create gender inequality.
Additionally, I do not propose a criminalization of sexual harassment, as
has occurred in France and in Israel, so there is less reason for courts to directly
link sexual harassment with sex crimes, such as sexual assault and rape. I believe
that even courts that are willing to condemn harassers civilly will be much less

169. Id. at 413.
170. See id. at 414-41.
171. Id. at 442. The Israeli sexual harassment statute indicated that its objective was “to prohibit
sexual harassment, in order to protect human dignity, liberty and privacy and in order to promote
equality between the sexes.” Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758-1998, SH No. 166 p. 1.
172. See Rimalt, supra note 167, at 442-44 (also noting that the association between sexual
harassment and other sex crimes “allowed a moralistic conceptualization to dominate the dignitary
harm of harassment,” diverting attention to “women’s honor,” among other unintended
consequences of criminalization).
173. Id. at 401-02.
174. For discussion of the evolution of the law of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination, see Hébert, supra note 5, at 439-47.
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likely to impose criminal sanctions on those harassers; accordingly, I believe that
criminalization of sexual harassment in a number of nations has contributed to
the underenforcement of those sexual harassment laws, a result I would not like
to see occur— or worsen— in the United States.
One might reasonably ask whether my proposal goes far enough. After all, I
am not proposing (in this article) that all forms of harassment be included within
this proposed statutory prohibition on sexual harassment based on the concept
of sexual harassment as a violation of dignity. I am not proposing (in this article)
the adoption in the United States of a federal statutory claim similar to a claim of
moral harassment in France or a claim of “bullying,” as has been advocated by
Professor David Yamada in numerous publications.175 One might reasonably
argue that if sexual harassment is to be prohibited not only because it is
discriminatory but also because it violates the dignity rights of harassed
employees, why other forms of harassment that are injurious to employees’
dignity should not also be prohibited.
I am sympathetic to those concerns, but am not yet ready to take on the
general hostility of American employers to the imposition of a “general civility
code,” even though I am generally in favor of civility in the workplace and do
not see the same risks that others do in requiring that employers be civil to their
employees, or at least that they refrain from certain types of uncivil behavior—
generally behavior that is degrading and humiliating and would violate the
dignity interests of those employees. Instead I am making a more modest
proposal: that conduct that is already often prohibited in the workplace—
sexually humiliating and degrading conduct that is severe or pervasive enough
to create a hostile, abusive, or offensive environment for the employees subjected
to that conduct—be found to be unlawful when it violates the dignity of the
harassed employee, regardless of what is found to have motivated that conduct.
That is, the law should equally prohibit such sexually humiliating and degrading
conduct, whether the conduct is undertaken because a supervisor or co-worker
does not like women (or men) in general, because the supervisor or co-worker
does not like women (or men) in a particular job or position, because the
supervisor or co-worker does not like this particular woman or man, or because
of some other reason. The harm of sexually humiliating and degrading conduct
should be recognized as harmful to the dignity of employees, regardless of
whether the courts recognize that the equality interests of employees may also be
implicated.
IV. CONCLUSION
For much of its history, France’s law concerning sexual harassment has been
narrower and more restrictive than the sexual harassment law of the United
States, but, unlike the United States’ prohibition of sexual harassment, France’s
prohibition has not been focused on the concept of discrimination. Recently,
France appears to have significantly broadened its prohibition on sexual
harassment, as part of its reenactment of a provision of the Penal Code that was

175. E.g., David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress
Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2010).
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declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council. Influenced by the
European Union Directives on harassment, France has incorporated the concept
of violation of dignity into its prohibition on sexual harassment, so that
degrading and humiliating conduct of a sexual nature can constitute sexual
harassment when that conduct results in a violation of an individual’s dignity.
In this article, I have argued that the United States should take a lesson from
the French law of sexual harassment—and should broaden its notion of sexual
harassment beyond just a form of discrimination to also recognize that sexual
harassment, even if not established as discriminatory in nature, should be
prohibited precisely because sexually harassing conduct is degrading and
humiliating, and therefore offensive to and violative of human dignity. I have
argued that the concept of dignity be recognized as an alternative and
independent ground for condemning sexual harassment under federal statutory
employment law. I have argued that sexual harassment should be prohibited
even if it is divorced from sex.

